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OKLAHOMA
LAW REVIEW
VOLUME 59

SUMMER 2006

NUMBER 2

THE PROMISE AND PERILS OF HYBRID
DEMOCRACY
ELIZABETH GARRETT*

For most Americans, democracy in the United States is not entirely
representative in structure, and none of us lives in a pure direct democracy
where laws are made only through popular votes. Instead, for over 70% of
Americans, government is a hybrid democracy1 — a combination of direct
democracy and representative institutions at the state and local levels, which
in turn influences national politics.2
Until recently, scholarship in law and social sciences has been incomplete
because analysts have focused mainly on representative institutions or
occasionally on the initiative process, but nearly always as separate
* Sydney M. Irmas Professor of Public Interest Law, Legal Ethics, Political Science, and
Policy, Planning, and Development, University of Southern California; Director, USC-Caltech
Center for the Study of Law and Politics. I thank Judge Robert Henry for his friendship and
support. I appreciate helpful comments from Adam Cox, Barry Friedman, Robert Henry, Andrei
Marmor, Mat McCubbins, Eric Posner, and Adrian Vermeule, participants at the Henry Lecture
at the University of Oklahoma Law School, faculty workshops at Ohio State Law School and
Pepperdine Law School, assistance from Jessica Wimer of the Gould School of Law Library,
and the excellent research assistance of Robert A. Olson (USC ’07) and additional research help
from Meegan I. Maczek (USC ’08).
XXA version of this article was presented as the annual Henry Lecture at the University of
Oklahoma College of Law on October 13, 2005.
1. See JOHN G. MATSUSAKA, FOR THE MANY OR THE FEW: THE INITIATIVE, PUBLIC POLICY,
AND AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 8 (2004) (stating that 71% of Americans live in a state or city that
allows initiatives). For a brief description of the initiative process in Oklahoma, see M. DANE
WATERS, THE INITIATIVE AND REFERENDUM ALMANAC 342-57 (2003). Many of Oklahoma’s
cities and towns, including Oklahoma City, Tulsa, Lawton, Norman, and Bartlesville, have
direct democracy on the local level.
2. See Elizabeth Garrett, Hybrid Democracy, 73 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1096 (2005)
[hereinafter Garrett, Hybrid Democracy].
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institutions. With political science leading the way, the interactions between
the two forms of democratic institutions have moved to center stage. For
example, empirical work identifies the ways in which the presence of an
initiative process in a state influences the content of laws passed by the
legislature,3 how voter turnout and campaigns in candidate elections are
affected by the presence of an initiative on the ballot,4 and how elected and
appointed officials often work to undermine the implementation of initiatives.5
These studies illustrate that considering hybrid democracy as a whole is more
likely to produce a realistic view of democratic institutions and point the way
to meaningful reform.
Hybrid democracy is here to stay, so we need to better understand how its
components interact. But even if we were writing on a clean slate and had the
ability to choose between a purely representative system and one with some
elements of direct democracy, I think we would do well to adopt some sort of
hybrid. A system that allows the possibility of the initiative and referendum
provides a check on elected representatives beyond the accountability of
periodic elections. In this Lecture, I will suggest some of the benefits that a
hybrid system can provide in three realms. First, hybrid elections allow
candidates to make more credible promises by running on platforms that
include simultaneous enactment of initiatives. The association of an initiative
with a candidate may also provide a richer information environment for
voters, although recent scholarship draws into question whether voting cues
are invariably enhanced given the strategic use of direct democracy by
politicians. Second, the initiative process provides a way to circumvent the
self-interest of legislators in designing institutions of government. Third, the
possibility of using initiatives to enact policy supplies political actors with a
tool that can serve majoritarian interests and can counter special interest
influence in legislative bargaining. As Governor Arnold Schwarzenegger has
demonstrated in California, governance by initiative profoundly changes the
dynamics of interbranch bargaining, although it does not seem to be a
sustainable strategy if used frequently. As I discuss these benefits, I will also
underscore the dangers of hybrid democracy and discuss reforms that seek to
reduce the perils while maximizing the promise of our hybrid system.
3. See, e.g., ELISABETH R. GERBER, THE POPULIST PARADOX: INTEREST GROUP INFLUENCE
(1999).
4. See, e.g., DANIEL A. SMITH & CAROLINE J. TOLBERT, EDUCATED BY INITIATIVE: THE
EFFECTS OF DIRECT DEMOCRACY ON CITIZENS AND POLITICAL ORGANIZATIONS IN THE
AMERICAN STATES (2004).
5. See, e.g., ELISABETH R. GERBER, ARTHUR LUPIA, MATHEW D. MCCUBBINS & D.
RODERICK KIEWIET, STEALING THE INITIATIVE: HOW STATE GOVERNMENT RESPONDS TO DIRECT
DEMOCRACY (2001).
AND THE PROMISE OF DIRECT LEGISLATION
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I. Candidates and Initiatives: Making Credible Policy Commitments
Hybrid democracy entails hybrid elections, which have different dynamics
than elections that solely concern selecting representatives. The presence of
an initiative on a ballot that also includes candidate elections will affect those
races, and vice versa. For example, initiatives increase overall voter turnout.6
In presidential elections, each ballot measure boosts turnout by half a
percentage, and in midterm elections, each ballot measure increases turnout
by 1.2%.7 The additional voters are not random citizens but are people
motivated to come to the polls by the subject matter of the initiative, so the
increased turnout does not necessarily benefit both candidates equally.
Political actors understand that initiatives on the ballot can have spillover
effects on candidate elections. Thus, they often do not wait to take advantage
of initiatives that other groups place on the ballot; instead, they play an active
role in determining how to benefit from the possibilities presented by hybrid
elections. Politicians use ballot measures to shape turnout in a way that aids
them while not similarly increasing the number of people voting for their
opponents. They also employ ballot measures to frame the issues of the
campaign in ways that highlight their message and enhance their images in the
minds of likely voters.
A. The Perils of Hybrid Elections: Crypto-Initiatives
Some scholars have described the use of initiatives by candidates in
campaigns as manipulative. Thad Kousser and Mathew McCubbins label such
initiatives as “crypto-initiatives” and argue that they are cynically used by
candidates and consultants to take advantage of an electorate that does not
have enough information to vote competently on the ballot measures.8 They
contend that the policies embodied in crypto-initiatives are unlikely to be
welfare-enhancing or effective at achieving their goals.9 Politicians using
crypto-initiatives are mainly attentive to the initiatives’ effect on the dynamics
of the campaign, such as voter turnout, not to whether they are well-drafted
or represent beneficial reform. Thus, “strategic political actors will pick

6. See SMITH & TOLBERT, supra note 4, at 31-52.
7. Id. at 40 (also finding that at a certain point, each additional measure does not further
increase turnout).
8. Thad Kousser & Mathew D. McCubbins, Social Choice, Crypto-Initiatives, and
Policymaking by Direct Democracy, 78 S. CAL. L. REV. 949, 950, 969-74 (2005).
9. Id. at 955.
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strategies . . . to serve partisan goals even if they lead to the passage of bad
policies.”10
Kousser and McCubbins describe several recent crypto-initiatives that they
believe illustrate the negative effects of hybrid elections.11 For example, in
2004 voters in eleven states were asked to pass measures defining marriage as
a relationship legally available only to heterosexual couples.12 Some of these
initiatives were the result of grassroots efforts touched off by legalization of
same-sex marriage in Massachusetts and the attempt to make these
relationships official in San Francisco. A few of these measures played a role
in close candidate elections, in ways that candidates may not have intended
initially, but that they took advantage of as campaigns developed. Thus, in
Kentucky the foundering campaign of Republican incumbent Jim Bunning
won a narrow victory thanks to rural voters energized by the ballot measure
on marriage and convinced by misleading advertisements that Bunning’s
opponent did not strongly oppose same-sex unions.13
Some of the other marriage initiatives, such as those in Michigan and Ohio,
were likely part of a more coordinated strategy to place them on the ballot of
battleground states in the presidential election so that they would help reelect
President Bush. The initiatives also had grassroots support, but it seems very
likely that national strategists encouraged those efforts in states pivotal to the
Electoral College vote where the margin of victory was expected to be close.
Some strategists have credited the ballot measure for President Bush’s narrow
and crucial victory in Ohio,14 although preliminary results from ongoing
empirical studies draw that claim into question.15 Certainly, however, the
numerous ballot measures on this topic, together with the press attention on
developments in Massachusetts and San Francisco, framed some of the
10. Id. at 976. Kousser and McCubbins argue that initiatives generally, not just cryptoinitiatives, tend to enact policy that does not enhance welfare. Id. at 955.
11. Id. at 969-74.
12. Id. at 971.
13. Kousser & McCubbins, supra note 8, at 971; James Dao, Gay Marriage: Same-Sex
Marriage Issue Key to Some G.O.P. Races, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 4, 2004, at P4.
14. See Brian Friel, Both Sides Claim Ballot-Issue Victories, 45 NAT’L J. 3415 (2004); Dao,
supra note 13, at P4.
15. Compare Alan Abramowitz, Terrorism, Gay Marriage, and Incumbency: Explaining
the Republican Victory in the 2004 Presidential Election, FORUM, Dec. 2004, at 5,
http://www.bepress.com/forum/vol2/iss4/art3/ (finding no effect from anti-same-sex marriage
ballot measures), with Todd Donovan, Caroline Tolbert, Daniel A. Smith & Janine Parry, Did
Gay Marriage Elect George W. Bush? (May 14-15, 2005) (unpublished paper prepared for
presentation at the 2005 State Politics Conference held in East Lansing, Mich.), available at
http://polisci.msu.edu/sppc2005/papers/fripm/dtsp_sppc05.pdf (finding that the Ohio measure
mobilized turnout of voters more likely to vote for Bush).
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“values” discussion in the election that helped President Bush and
Republicans.
Although some might argue that these issues allow voters to draw valid
conclusions about the presidential candidates’ characters and thus are relevant
to voter competence, the measures had generally pernicious effects on the
federal elections. The initiatives diverted attention from major issues with
greater significance for the future of the country — for example, America’s
invasion of and continuing involvement in Iraq, the burgeoning budget deficit,
and the related looming crisis in entitlement programs. As such, the initiatives
are the sort that Kousser and McCubbins indict, which political operatives use
and sometimes generate to enact unwise or unnecessary policies in the
absence of robust debate solely to affect outcomes of candidate elections.
They were unnecessary in most, if not all, of the states in which they were
enacted because there was little threat that courts or legislatures in Utah,
Mississippi, Oklahoma, or other similarly red states were likely to endorse
same-sex unions. Except in Oregon, there was little opposition to the
measures. It seems likely that many voters were not aware that some of the
initiatives not only defined marriage to include only traditional marriages, but
also ruled out civil unions and eliminated other rights of same-sex committed
couples.16
B. The Promise of Hybrid Elections: Credible Promises and Voting Cues
Although crypto-initiatives may be a peril of hybrid elections, not all ballot
measures used by candidates are crypto-initiatives with largely negative
consequences for policies and campaigns. On the contrary, combining a
candidate election with a ballot measure or series of initiatives can empower
voters in both realms of hybrid democracy in several ways.17
First, coordinating a candidate campaign with an initiative can allow
politicians to make credible policy commitments to voters. Candidate
campaigns consist of a series of promises by people running for elected office.
It is difficult for voters to know which promises are credible and which are
“cheap talk.”18 Voters’ only recourse when they discover a candidate has
16. Eight of the eleven initiatives that passed in November 2004 — including the one in
Oklahoma — not only defined marriage in the traditional way, but also banned civil unions or
other domestic partnership benefits. See Kavan Peterson, 50-State Rundown on Gay Marriage
Laws, STATELINE.ORG, Nov. 3, 2004, http://www.stateline.org/live/ViewPage.action?siteNode
Id=136&languageId=1&contentId=15576.
17. Some of this discussion is drawn from Elizabeth Garrett, Crypto-Initiatives in Hybrid
Democracy, 78 S. CAL. L. REV. 985 (2005) [hereinafter Garrett, Crypto-Initiatives].
18. See David Austen-Smith, Strategic Models of Talk in Political Decision Making, 13
INT’L POL. SCI. REV. 45 (1992) (discussing “cheap talk” in politics); Garrett, Crypto-Initiatives,
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failed to follow through on campaign promises is to refuse to reelect her.
Candidates are likely to heavily discount this penalty when they are running
for office, and they know that reelection is unlikely to hinge on one issue or
one broken promise. The problem of making credible campaign promises is
particularly acute for challengers who have no record of public service that
voters can analyze in order to evaluate the trustworthiness of campaign
pledges.
Hybrid democracy provides all candidates — challengers and incumbents —
a means to credibly communicate with voters about their policy agendas. If a
candidate spends time or money on an initiative, she sends a costly, and
therefore more trustworthy, signal about her views on the issue.19 For
example, Jerry Brown did more than just talk about reforming politics and
campaigns when he ran for the California governorship in 1974; he also
championed the Political Reform Act that was on the same ballot.20 Voters
who supported his reform agenda but worried that he would back away from
those promises once he gained office could reduce his ability to renege by
simultaneously electing him and enacting comprehensive reform. Speaking
to a different audience, Governor Pete Wilson tried to convince conservative
Republicans that he would implement policies they valued when he ran
together with the country’s harshest three-strikes law and an initiative that
would have denied public services to undocumented workers.21 He thus made
a costly commitment to key voters that he would not support social policies
they found distasteful, both because the initiatives would shape the political
environment and because it would be harder for him to reverse course after
concretely associating himself with the measures.
Using hybrid democracy in this way — to elect officials and simultaneously
enact policies that limit their discretion22 — reduces the amount of monitoring
supra note 17. See generally GLENN R. PARKER, SELF-P OLICING IN POLITICS 59 (2004)
(discussing difficulty for voters to obtain trustworthy information about how faithful politicians
will be with respect to promises they make).
19. See ARTHUR LUPIA & MATHEW D. MCCUBBINS, THE DEMOCRATIC DILEMMA: CAN
CITIZENS LEARN WHAT THEY NEED TO KNOW? 209 (1998).
20. See PETER SCHRAG, PARADISE LOST: CALIFORNIA’S EXPERIENCE, AMERICA’S FUTURE
226 (2004).
21. See STEPHEN P. NICHOLSON, VOTING THE AGENDA: CANDIDATES, ELECTIONS, AND
BALLOT PROPOSITIONS 98 (2005). Proposition 187 pertaining to undocumented workers was
struck down as unconstitutional. See League of United Latin Am. Citizens v. Wilson, 997 F.
Supp. 1244 (C.D. Cal. 1997); League of United Latin Am. Citizens v. Wilson, 908 F. Supp. 755
(C.D. Cal. 1995).
22. For a discussion of other ways initiatives can limit executive discretion, see John G.
Matsusaka, Direct Democracy and the Executive Branch (Jan. 14-15, 2005) (unpublished paper
presented at the USC-Caltech Center for the Study of Law and Politics Conference on Direct
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required of voters to determine whether politicians keep their campaign
promises. It is therefore a way to reduce principal-agent slack between voters
and representatives. Of course, enacting the initiative would constrain either
candidate’s discretion once elected, whether or not she supported the
initiative. I am not arguing that the initiative will bind only the candidate
supporting it — it will bind whoever is elected — but rather that a candidate’s
support is a more costly signal than a promise in a platform. Politicians
understand this; therefore, associating themselves with an initiative is a more
credible signal than using the same themes in their platforms.
Second, candidate involvement in initiative elections may provide voters
with better cues about the ballot measures so that they can vote competently
with limited information. The vast majority of voters do not go to the polls
with comprehensive knowledge of all races, just as they do not go to the store
with complete information about all the products they want to buy. In both
cases, they rationally rely on shortcuts that they believe will allow them to
decide in a way that is consistent with their preferences but which economizes
on information costs.23 In candidate elections, the primary voting cue is party
affiliation, which appears on the ballot; in addition, the cue of incumbency can
be evident from the ballot in some states. Initiative campaigns are relatively
low-information environments because they do not provide these easy
shortcuts for voters, who must instead work to determine which groups
support or oppose the ballot measure, the intensity of their views, and how the
groups’ preferences line up with those of voters.24
Kousser and McCubbins argue, by contrast, that crypto-initiatives will
impair voter competence. In developing such initiatives, they contend,
candidates search for issues that will not elicit opposition, because that might
turn out people who will vote for their opponents. In the absence of vigorous
advocacy on both sides of an issue, voters are less likely to gain sufficient
information to make competent choices.25 Certainly, some crypto-initiatives
are constructed to minimize the extent of voting cues because they are
designed to avoid strong opposition, but other aspects of hybrid elections
suggest that voting cues may be enhanced when politicians are aligned with
Democracy), available at http://lawweb.usc.edu/cslp/conferences/direct_democracy_05/
documents/Matsusaka.pdf.
23. See, e.g., Arthur Lupia & Richard Johnston, Are Voters to Blame? Voter Competence
and Elite Maneuvers in Referendums, in REFERENDUM DEMOCRACY: CITIZENS, ELITES AND
DELIBERATION IN REFERENDUM CAMPAIGNS 191, 194-95 (Matthew Mendelsohn & Andrew
Parkin eds., 2001).
24. See Elizabeth Garrett & Daniel A. Smith, Veiled Political Actors and Campaign
Disclosure Laws in Direct Democracy, 4 ELECTION L.J. 295 (2005) (discussing voting cues in
issue campaigns).
25. Kousser & McCubbins, supra note 8, at 949.

Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2006

234

OKLAHOMA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 59:227

ballot measures. Close association between an initiative and a candidate
allows voters to use the familiar cue of political party in both parts of hybrid
democracy. Political parties are already relatively active in many ballot
measure campaigns, and they work to publicize their involvement through
slate mailings and advertisements.26 Candidates using ballot measures as part
of their campaign strategy will also make their endorsements clear to voters,
who can use the affiliation to draw conclusions about the ballot measure, just
as they use the policy promoted by the initiative to draw conclusions about the
candidates’ priorities.
Moreover, it is not necessarily the case that initiatives associated with
candidate campaigns will inevitably fail to produce vigorous opposition. If
candidate elections are competitive — which, unfortunately, is not the reality
in many legislative races, but may be true in other races — then the opponent
of the candidate running with a ballot measure has an interest in ensuring that
the initiative faces opposition as well. For example, many viewed the
California special election in November 2005 as a prelude to the 2006
gubernatorial election.27 Likely opponents of Governor Schwarzenegger were
active in campaigns to defeat his ballot initiatives,28 in the hope that he would
fail at the polls, find himself unable to govern effectively, and enter the race
for reelection substantially weakened. Drawing the wisdom of the initiative
into question challenges its supporter’s judgment and underscores policy
differences for the voters. More empirical work on voting cues and how
citizens can use them most effectively to cast their ballots competently is
necessary, but it seems likely that under some circumstances hybrid elections
can improve voter competence rather than undermine it.
C. Reforms of Hybrid Campaigns
Hybrid elections, in which candidates increasingly coordinate their
campaigns with initiative campaigns, are a reality in many states and are not
necessarily a negative development for politics. The perils posed by such
campaigns, however, suggest that we should consider reform of the direct
26. For a discussion of the involvement of political parties in initiative campaigns, see
SMITH & TOLBERT, supra note 4, at 116-27, and Richard L. Hasen, Parties Take the Initiative
(and Vice Versa), 100 COLUM. L. REV. 731 (2000).
27. See Michael Finnegan, Special Election Rattles ’06 Races, L.A. TIMES, June 19, 2005,
at B1.
28. See, e.g., Press Release, Phil Angelides, Statement from California State Treasurer Phil
Angelides Regarding the Governor’s Decision to Call a Special Election (June 13, 2005),
available at http://www.angelides.com/media/releases/2005_0613_special.html (Angelidas, the
Democratic candidate for governor, attacked the call for a special election and vowed to “fight
hard against the Governor’s harmful agenda.”).
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democracy elements of our hybrid system. I will discuss two reforms here:
one concerning the durability of initiatives, and the other concerning
campaign finance rules. First, to combat the concern that initiatives,
particularly crypto-initiatives used by candidates solely for their spillover
effects, may enact unwise policies that will lead to lower social welfare,29 the
laws they enact should be less durable. Statutory initiatives should be subject
to revision and repeal by the legislature; constitutional initiatives should have
sunset provisions so that they expire unless reenacted.
All states except California allow legislatures to modify statutory
initiatives.30 In California, statutory initiatives are insulated from subsequent
legislative involvement unless specifically authorized by the initiative itself.31
A better method is one similar to Oklahoma’s approach, which allows repeal
and amendment under certain circumstances.32 Because lawmakers are often
hostile to initiatives, which circumvent the traditional process to enact policy,
some protection from the legislature is required. Therefore, legislative
involvement with statutory initatives should be limited so that no change can
be made until after some experience and only then with a supermajority vote.
Initiatives supported by legislators and political parties may not face the
same danger that they will be undermined; indeed, incumbents have an
incentive to produce results because voters may evaluate their performance in
part on the basis of how well the ballot measures they supported have been
implemented. An initiative backed by the governor and supported by the
people, however, may be resisted by the legislature — in fact, the governor

29. See Kousser & McCubbins, supra note 8, at 954-55, (making that argument because
voters do not consider dead weight losses). But see Garrett, Crypto-Initiatives, supra note 17,
at 992 & n.19 (questioning whether this is necessarily true when candidates are associated with
ballot measures).
30. See generally Waters, supra note 1, at 27 (providing rules in all states with initiatives).
31. CAL. CONST. art. II, § 10(c).
32. OKLA. CONST. art. V, § 7 (“The reservation of the powers of the initiative and
referendum in this article shall not deprive the Legislature of the right to repeal any law, propose
or pass any measure, which may be consistent with the Constitution of the State and the
Constitution of the United States.”) Others have proposed changing the California system to
allow more legislative involvement in statutory initiatives. See, e.g., CAL. COMM’N ON
CAMPAIGN FIN., DEMOCRACY BY INITIATIVE: SHAPING CALIFORNIA’S FOURTH BRANCH OF
GOVERNMENT 118-19 (1992); Tracy Westen & Robert M. Stern, Ending a Love-Hate
Relationship, CAL. B.J., July 2005, at 8 (referring to the 1992 study and continuing to support
such changes).
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may have turned to direct democracy because of obstruction by lawmakers.33
That obstruction will presumably continue after the election.
Many initiatives are constitutional amendments and thus cannot be changed
solely by the legislature, but only by a subsequent popular vote.34 These
initiatives should expire after a certain period of time, requiring either that the
legislature resubmit them to the people or that proponents again gather
signatures to place them on the ballot for extension. The analysis of hybrid
elections provides guidance about how long the popularly initiated
constitutional amendments should remain in effect before they expire. In
order to effectively bind politicians to promises made credible by association
with a ballot measure, these constitutional provisions should remain in effect
at least as long as one term of office, and perhaps longer so that the push for
reenactment becomes separated from the candidate’s reelection campaign and
reflects a strong independent desire to retain the policy. Another factor
relevant to the length of time before any initiative would sunset is the need for
settled expectations, particularly in some realms.35 Accordingly, I would
propose that constitutional initiatives sunset after ten or twelve years.
No special treatment should be afforded to initiatives on the basis of their
popularity on Election Day. Although one could argue that constitutional
initiatives passed by a landslide, say by three-fourths of those voting on the
measure, should not face a sunset, Kousser and McCubbins’s analysis
suggests that crypto-initiatives are constructed to face little opposition and
thus might be enacted by a substantial margin in an environment that
undermines the ability of voters to vote competently.36
One subset of initiatives could be made more durable, however. For
example, if a commission has been used to consider election reform,37 then the
reasons for sunsetting a constitutional initiative do not apply. There has been
an opportunity for deliberation and debate, the proposal has been amended and
33. There are allegations in California that the Attorney-General, a Democrat, has used his
powers in the initiative process to undermine the Governor’s proposals by approving unfairly
worded titles and descriptions and by applying technical requirements rigorously to keep some
of Schwarzenegger’s proposals off the ballot. See Robert Salladay, Lockyer Is Accused of
Stacking Deck Against Initiatives, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 1, 2005, at A1. Whatever the truth of these
charges, they demonstrate that even initiatives supported by powerful politicians may still face
opposition by those who have responsibility for implementation.
34. WATERS, supra note 1, at 27.
35. For example, initiatives that affect redistricting or structures of representation must be
in place for at least a decade to avoid some reforms expiring before they can have any
significant impact on governance.
36. Kousser and McCubbins, supra note 8, at 977.
37. The use of commissions to draft initiatives — particularly dealing with complicated
election reform — is discussed in Part II.C. See infra text accompanying notes 89-96.
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changed throughout the process, and the involvement of a commission
operates as a check much as the legislative process does. Just as constitutional
measures placed before the people by the legislature would be permanent, the
work of commissions should be accorded durability. Applying one default
rule for popularly generated initiatives and another for initiatives that are
vetted by the legislature or a commission would encourage groups to work
through the latter routes.
For popular initiatives that expire and are not placed on the ballot for
extension or permanent enactment by the legislature or a commission, fewer
signatures would be required to place reenactment on the ballot. Because part
of the rationale for a sunset requirement is to allow constitutional initiatives
to be modified to reflect the experience with the law, proponents should
qualify for the reduced signature thresholds even if the measure is slightly
different from the original enactment. This may require some judgment calls
by the official certifying the petitions for circulation, but the general rule
should be that changes that further the purpose of the measure will be allowed
without triggering higher signature thresholds.38
Requiring that constitutional initiatives sunset will make them less
attractive to those advocating change because the policies they implement will
be less durable and will require that time and money be spent to reenact them
every decade or so. Thus, fewer initiatives are likely to be proposed if sunsets
applied, although the number on the ballot might not decline substantially
because of the need to periodically reconsider those that are enacted. The
reform might also encourage proponents of initiatives to use the statutory form
in states where that option is available — a positive development because it
would allow legislatures to be more involved in the development of policy
over time. Statutory initiatives are more consistent with a hybrid democracy
because they allow a way to spark change from outside the legislature while
still relying on the expertise of lawmakers to improve policy, correct mistakes,
and take account of changed circumstances. Thus, this reform will calibrate
the hybrid system in a way that avoids entrenching policies beyond a relatively
short time frame but still allows the initiative process to be used to force
consideration of new ideas and provide some experience with new policies.
Second, the close association between candidates and some ballot measures
supplies justification for aggressive campaign finance regulation in the direct

38. This is a standard used by Arizona in determining whether the legislature can amend
a statutory initiative, see ARIZ. CONST. art. 4, pt. 1, § 1, cl. 6(c), and is used for some initiatives
in California that allow subsequent legislative involvement, CAL. COMM’N ON CAMPAIGN FIN.,
supra note 32, at 118-19 (discussing the Political Reform Act, which allowed amendments that
further its purpose and that pass by a two-thirds majority).
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democracy arena.39 Because candidates use initiative campaigns to enhance
their chances of winning office, the same possibilities for quid pro quo
corruption and the appearance of such corruption exist in some issue
campaigns.40 Presumably, whatever favors are likely to flow to big
contributors from candidates are also likely to flow to those underwriting
ballot measure campaigns in which candidates are involved. Limiting
contributions to candidate-controlled issue committees should therefore be
found constitutional using the well-established state interest of combating quid
pro quo corruption.41
Nevertheless, even if constitutional, such limitations may not be sufficient
to combat the perception of corruption. When regulations are applied only to
committees formally or actually controlled by candidates and officeholders,
interests wishing to curry favor with candidates can fund issue committees
that remain entirely separate from candidates. If these “uncoordinated” efforts
are helpful in publicizing and passing an initiative that a candidate views as
important to her campaign, she will certainly know about the support and
appreciate it. Such support will either elicit the sort of favorable treatment
large contributors seek, such as access to policy makers,42 or it will lead to the
public perception that such favoritism exists.43 This is the same problem that
39. See, e.g., Elizabeth Garrett, Democracy in the Wake of the California Recall, 153 U.
PA. L. REV. 239, 247-53 (2004) [hereinafter Garrett, Democracy in the Wake]; Garrett, Hybrid
Democracy, supra note 2, at 1105-10; Richard L. Hasen, Rethinking the Unconstitutionality of
Contribution and Expenditure Limits in Ballot Measure Campaigns, 78 S. CAL. L. REV. 885
(2005).
40. For the articulation of the corruption rationale in candidate elections, see McConnell
v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 182-84 (2003), and Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 25-26 (1976) (per
curiam).
41. Thus, regulations to this effect promulgated by the California Fair Political Practices
Commission (FPPC) should not be overturned on constitutional grounds, although there is some
question whether the FPPC had the authority to promulgate such regulations in the context of issue
committees. See CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 2, §§ 18530.9, 18531.5 (2004). Section 18530.9, applying
contributor limitations to issue committees controlled by candidates, is currently being challenged
in court and was not applied during the 2005 special election campaign. See Citizens to Save Cal.
v. Cal. Fair Political Practices Comm’n, No. 05AS00555 (Cal. Super. Ct. Mar. 25, 2005) (order
granting preliminary injunction), reh’g of appeal granted No. C049642 (Cal. Ct. App. May 31,
2005), available at http://www.saccourt.com/geninfo/News_Media/ Citizens_vs_FPPC.asp. An
initiative on campaign finance reform will appear on the 2006 general election ballot in California
to enact similar restrictions on candidate-controlled issue committees. See California Nurses Clean
Money and Fair Elections Act of 2006, Cal. Proposition 89, available at http://www.ss.ca.gov/
elections/vig_06/general_06/pdf/ proposition_89/entire_prop89.pdf.
42. See John M. de Figueiredo & Elizabeth Garrett, Paying for Politics, 78 S. CAL. L. REV.
591, 609-11 (2005).
43. For a discussion of the difficulty of using public perception to justify campaign finance
regulation, see Nathaniel Persily & Kelli Lammie, Perceptions of Corruption and Campaign
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exists with respect to independent expenditures in candidate elections, and it
is clearly an aspect of the current hybrid system with respect to contributions
to initiative campaigns.
Subjecting unaffiliated committees to campaign finance limitations is more
problematic under current jurisprudence than applying limitations to
candidate-controlled committees. The further the distance from the candidate,
the more attenuated the relationship to the quid pro quo justification.44 The
difficulty here is the same as that which plagues campaign finance regulations
generally: without very comprehensive reform, shutting off the spigot of
money in one part of the system merely reroutes it to another part of the
system where it can flow unimpeded.45 This is occurring even in the federal
context as representatives and senators use issue committees to raise unlimited
amounts of money, unregulated by the federal campaign laws. The Federal
Election Commission reversed course in August 2005 in an advisory opinion
issued in response to a petition by members of Congress seeking to raise soft
money for issue committees formed to defeat the redistricting initiative in
California.46 Although it had ruled two years before that the Bipartisan
Campaign Reform Act regulated such activities,47 it reached the opposite
conclusion in the 2005 Advisory Opinion, in part because the initiative
appeared on a special election ballot with no federal candidate races.
Nevertheless, the appearance of corruption is not necessarily avoided by
disaggregating the initiative election from the candidate election;
officeholders who value retaining the current system of redistricting were no
doubt grateful to those who provided them money to defeat the reform
proposal.
The integration of ballot measures with candidate campaigns provides an
additional justification for sweeping disclosure regulations in the realm of
direct democracy. Disclosure is the primary form of state campaign finance
regulation of issue committees, and it is justified on the ground that it provides

Finance: When Public Opinion Determines Constitutional Law, 153 U. PA. L. REV. 119, 141-44
(2005).
44. See Hasen, supra note 39, at 907-15 (discussing the constitutional issues raised by
expanding regulation beyond candidate-controlled issue committees).
45. See Samuel Issacharoff & Pamela S. Karlan, The Hydraulics of Campaign Finance
Reform, 77 TEX. L. REV. 1705 (1999).
46. See The Honorable Howard L. Berman and the Honorable John T. Doolittle, FEC
Advisory Op. 2005-10 (Aug. 22, 2005), available at http://www.fec.gov/aos/2005/ao200510final.pdf.
47. See Stop Taxpayer Money for Politicians Committee and United States Representative
Jeff Flake, FEC Advisory Op. 2003-12, Fed. Election Camp. Fin. Guide (CCH) ¶6396 (July 29,
2003), available at http://ao.nictusa.com/ao/no/030012.html.
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information to voters about the forces behind ballot measure campaigns.48
Citizens can make better judgments about how to vote on ballot measures
when they have the information to judge whether their interests are shared by
groups supporting or opposing the initiatives and when they can use the
amount of money these groups spend as a reliable proxy of the intensity of
their views. Although most courts have been willing to uphold disclosure
statutes, there are a few cases where courts have determined that the interest
in anonymous political speech trumps the informational interests of voters.49
The state interest in disclosure is surely more weighty when the information
not only provides voters cues about the ballot measure itself but also provides
insight into the candidate who is actively supporting the initiative. It would
undermine electoral integrity if well-to-do interests could hide their support
for a candidate by funneling money to a ballot measure she views as a vital
part of her campaign. Thus, aggressive campaign disclosure laws designed to
pierce through veils that seek to hide the identities of individuals and groups
active in issue campaigns will often provide necessary information to voters
in both parts of a hybrid election.50
II. Hybrid Democracy and Designing Electoral Institutions
The need for some form of hybrid democracy is plainly seen in the context
of electoral reform. The U.S. Constitution leaves open many of the questions
relevant to the design of democratic institutions; one of its strengths is that it
sets forth only minimal requirements and then allows flexibility to develop
various kinds of electoral institutions compatible with different visions of
democracy. State constitutions contain more details, but they also allow room
for change. Moreover, states amend and revise their constitutions more
frequently than the federal Constitution is modified.
The key question in light of this flexibility becomes who will design the
rules that govern elections, campaigns, and the shape of our democratic
48. See Elizabeth Garrett, McConnell v. FEC and Disclosure, 3 ELECTION L.J. 237, 237
(2004).
49. Compare ACLU of Nev. v. Heller, 378 F.3d 979 (9th Cir. 2004) (striking state
disclosure down, relying heavily on the Court’s protection of anonymous political speech in
McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm’n, 514 U.S. 334 (1995)), with Majors v. Abell, 361 F.3d 349
(7th Cir. 2004) (upholding state disclosure statute, relying on McConnell and distinguishing
McIntyre).
50. Under these circumstances, disclosure could also be supported by the anticircumvention
rationale articulated in McConnell as a justification for regulation of contributions to state and
local parties. See McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 159-62 (2003); see also Richard Briffault,
McConnell v. FEC and the Transformation of Campaign Finance Law, 3 ELECTION L.J. 147,
152-53 (2004).
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institutions. Often lawmakers themselves determine the rules, in which case
the regulated are the regulators. Under such circumstances, there is the worry
that self-interest will prevail over the public interest and that rules will be
chosen to entrench the already powerful, decrease competition from the
outside, and silence new voices.
Given the inherent conflict of interest faced by lawmakers in designing the
rules that will shape their careers, involving the people more directly in
decision making about democratic institutions is justified.51 Thus, one
advantage of hybrid democracy is that it allows the people a formalized role
in institutional design decisions. However, with that role comes peril, namely,
the fear that that the voters are likely to adopt initiatives that dangerously
weaken the legislature and that the binary format of American initiatives is a
poor way to design complex institutions.
A. The Promise of Hybrid Democracy: Avoiding the Self-Interest of
Legislators
Although direct democracy was primarily a populist reaction against
industrial interests like railroads and mining companies,52 its early supporters
also saw it as a way to circumvent self-interested legislators who would block
governance reforms supported by Populists and Progressives, such as the
direct primary and laws to eliminate corrupt political practices.53 The
initiative continues to be a tool used by reformers to push changes opposed by
those with vested interests in current institutional arrangements. Increasingly,
it appears that the modern initiative process is being used to modify
institutions of representative government in a particular way: to combat
increasing polarization and to realign institutions so that they produce
outcomes more consistent with the preferences of the median voter. Samuel
Issacharoff contends that the success of incumbents in eliminating competition
from many federal and state elections has resulted in a “rebellion of the
51. See DENNIS F. THOMPSON, JUST ELECTIONS: CREATING A FAIR ELECTORAL PROCESS IN
THE UNITED STATES 14 (2002) [hereinafter THOMPSON, JUST ELECTIONS]; Dennis F. Thompson,

The Role of Theorists and Citizens in Just Elections: A Response to Professors Cain, Garrett,
and Sabl, 4 ELECTION L.J. 153, 158-60 (2005). Although Thompson sees a role for popular
involvement, he has substantial reservations about the initiative process in the United States.
See THOMPSON, JUST ELECTIONS, supra, at 126-43.
52. See generally STEVEN L. PIOTT, GIVING VOTERS A VOICE: THE ORIGINS OF THE
INITIATIVE AND REFERENDUM IN AMERICA (2003). Piott discusses the rise of the initiative
process in Oklahoma, which was largely a reaction by farmers and miners to reduce the
disproportionate political influence of railroads, banks, and mining companies in the state. See
id. at 60-82.
53. See, e.g., JAMES W. SULLIVAN, DIRECT LEGISLATION BY THE CITIZENSHIP THROUGH THE
INITIATIVE AND REFERENDUM 100 (1893) (taking aim at the “lawmaking monopoly”).
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median voter.”54 Because of its format — asking a question on a single
subject that can be answered only with “yes” or “no” — direct democracy
tends to favor the median voter, at least as long as turnout in the election is
representative of the polity as a whole.55
Empowering the median voter was the explicit objective of the initiative
passed by Californians in 1996 to replace the parties’ closed primaries with
a blanket primary.56 In a closed primary, only party members can participate
in the selection of the nominees for the general election, and those wanting to
vote in the primary have to affiliate with the party well before the election.
Closed primaries tend to result in the selection of more extreme candidates
because only the most motivated partisans will take the time to vote, leaving
voters with a choice between two relatively extreme candidates in the general
election. In a closed primary, cross-over voting for a particular office is
costly; a voter has to register as a member of the party and then forego voting
in her regular primary for all other races.57 A blanket primary, on the other
hand, encourages cross-over voting in the primaries because there is little cost
to it; the ballot allows a person to vote in the Democratic primary for one
office, in the Republican primary for another, and in the Libertarian primary
for a third.
Blanket primaries are moderating devices designed to move political parties
closer to the center, or, in the words of the California ballot pamphlet, to
“weaken” party “hard-liners” and empower “moderate problem-solvers.”58
Comparing the two primaries illustrates how difficult a concept “meaningful
voter choice” really is.59 There is arguably more of a choice in the general
election — and stronger parties — in a world of closed primaries, although the
more extreme candidates may not closely reflect the preferences of most
54. Samuel Issacharoff, Collateral Damage: The Endangered Center in American Politics,
46 WM. & MARY L. REV. 415, 416 (2004).
55. See ROBERT D. COOTER, THE STRATEGIC CONSTITUTION 145-47 (2000); see also John
G. Matsusaka, Direct Democracy Works, 19 J. ECON. PERSP. 185, 192 (2005) (describing
reasons direct democracy favors median voter and when it may not tend in that policy direction).
56. Open Primary Act, Cal. Proposition 198 (1996) (codified at CAL. ELEC. CODE § 2001
(West repealed 2000)), available at http://primary96.ss.ca.gov/e/ballot/198txt.html.
57. Crossover voting is somewhat less costly in the traditional open primary because the
voter need not re-register to vote in a different primary. However, she still loses the opportunity
to vote in her regular primary for other offices. In an open primary, a voter can choose which
party’s primary to participate in on the day of the election, but she is limited to voting only in
that primary for all offices.
58. Cal. Democratic Party v. Jones, 530 U.S. 567, 570 (2000).
59. For discussions of how the blanket primary in California affected cross-over voting and
candidates, see UNIV. OF CAL., BERKELEY, INST. OF GOVERNMENTAL STUDIES, VOTING AT THE
POLITICAL FAULT LINE: CALIFORNIA'S EXPERIMENT WITH THE BLANKET PRIMARY (Bruce E. Cain
& Elisabeth R. Gerber eds., 2002).
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voters who tend to be relatively moderate. The nominees that emerge from a
blanket primary more closely mirror voter preferences, but there are fewer
grounds on which to choose between them because their policy positions will
be much closer.
The Supreme Court struck down California’s blanket primary, abruptly
ending the experiment with reform,60 but those seeking electoral reform
continue to turn to the initiative process as a way to implement change resisted
by political parties and office holders. Empirical research on the differences
between electoral institutions in states with robust direct democracy and those
without it suggests some systematic differences, although fewer than one
might expect. Caroline Tolbert has found that “[s]tates with a populist climate
and frequent initiative use are more likely to adopt three governance policies:
legislative term limits, state [tax and expenditure limitations], and
supermajority tax rules.”61 Nathaniel Persily and Melissa Cully Anderson
considered the enactment of various electoral reforms, but their findings
undermine the “strong claims that are often made about legislative capture
inhibiting election reform.”62 Only enactment of legislative term limits is
“unimaginable” without hybrid democracy, and the initiative has played an
important, although sometimes indirect, role in the adoption of public
financing for legislative campaigns and redistricting commissions.63 Their
findings are only preliminary, but even if hybrid democracy does not
inevitably lead to different types of governance institutions,64 it is still the case
that it offers the promise of a mechanism for reform that circumvents selfinterested legislators. It is that promise that has inspired groups like Common
Cause and Public Interest Research Group (PIRG) to use the initiative process

60. Cal. Democratic Party, 530 U.S. 567.
61. Caroline J. Tolbert, Changing Rules for State Legislatures: Direct Democracy and
Governance Policies, in CITIZENS AS LEGISLATORS: DIRECT DEMOCRACY IN THE UNITED STATES
171, 187 (Shaun Bowler, Todd Donovan & Caroline J. Tolbert eds., 1998).
62. Nathaniel Persily & Melissa Cully Anderson, Regulating Democracy Through Direct
Democracy: The Use of Direct Legislation in Election Law Reform, 78 S. CAL. L. REV. 997,
1034 (2005).
63. Id. at 1033-34; see also John Pippen, Shaun Bowler, & Todd Donovan, Election
Reform and Direct Democracy: Campaign Finance Regulations in the American States, 30 AM.
POL. RES. 559, 573-74 (2002) (finding that initiative states were more likely to restrict campaign
contributions and to increase regulation of contributions to candidates from political parties and
PACs).
64. Persily & Cully Anderson, supra note 62, at 999. A recent study reinforces the
conclusion that the presence of the initiative process does not significantly affect the design of
democratic insitutions. John G. Matsusaka, Direct Democracy and Electoral Reform, in THE
MARKETPLACE OF DEMOCRACY: ELECTORAL COMPETITION AND AMERICAN POLITICS (Michael
P. McDonald & John C. Samples eds., forthcoming 2006).
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as part of their efforts to establish nonpartisan redistricting commissions and
public financing of legislative and other elections.65
Hybrid democracy may have propelled efforts to move redistricting from
self-interested state legislators to more nonpartisan commissions. Such
commissions are more frequently used in states with hybrid democracy,
although they are usually established by the legislature as a response to the
threat of an initiative.66 For example, trying to use the indirect influence of
direct democracy, Governor Arnold Schwarzenegger of California demanded
that the legislature create a nonpartisan commission of retired judges, and
when his threat was ignored, he took the issue directly to the voters.67 The
progressive political reform group Common Cause joined with the Governor
in supporting the ballot proposition, and it mounted similar efforts using the
tool of direct democracy in other states.68 Although redistricting reform was
defeated in both California and Ohio in 2005,69 it remains an issue on the
national agenda in part because of those ballot campaigns. Not only are
redistricting commissions under active consideration in other states with the
initiative process, but also Representative John Tanner (D-TN) has introduced
a bill in Congress that would require all states to use nonpartisan commissions
for federal redistricting.70 If the initiative succeeds in some of the large states,
65. See Common Cause, Redistricting, http://www.commoncause.org/site/pp.asp?c=dk
LNK1MQIwG&b=196481 (last visited May 28, 2006); State PIRGs Working Together,
http://www.pirg.org (last visited May 28, 2006); see also Raphael Lewis, Groups to Push
Redistricting Plan, BOSTON GLOBE, Aug. 2, 2005, at B4 (discussing the petition drive in
Massachusetts led by Common Cause Massachusetts); Thomas E. Mann, Redistricting Reform,
NAT’L VOTER, June 2005, at 4, 6 (discussing involvement of the League of Women Voters).
66. Persily & Cully Anderson, supra note 62, at 1009-10. But see Matsusaka, supra note
64 (finding that the difference between initiative and noninitiative states in adopting
commissions cannot be attributed to availability of initiative).
67. Peter Nicholas, Gov. to Call for Special Session, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 1, 2005, at A1; see
also Nicholas D. Mosich, Note, Judging the Three-Judge Panel: An Evaluation of California’s
Proposed Redistricting Commission, 79 S. CAL. L. REV. 165 (2005) (evaluating
Schwarzenegger’s proposal in comparison to those of other commissions).
68. See Press Release, Common Cause, Independent Redistricting Commisions Give Voters
the True Power to Choose — California Common Cause Announces Support of Reform
Legislation (Feb. 17, 2005), available at http://www.commoncause.org/site/apps/nl/content
2.asp?c=dkLNK1MQIwG&b=194883&ct=429369.
69. See Sam Hirsch & Thomas E. Mann, Op-Ed., For Election Reform, a Heartening
Defeat, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 11, 2005, at A23.
70. Fairness and Independence in Redistricting Act of 2005, H.R. 2642, 109th Cong.
(2005); see also Editorial, Ending the Gerrymander Wars, N.Y. TIMES, May 30, 2005, at A14.
The bill would also restrict states from redistricting for federal legislative office more than once
a decade. See H.R. 2642, § 2. Congress has the option to make rules concerning federal
elections under the Constitution’s elections clause, which leaves the rules up to the states absent
congressional mandate. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 4, cl. 1. If nonpartisan commissions are used
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national action becomes more likely. The more representatives who already
come from states using independent redistricting commissions, then the fewer
the number of members who lose by the conversion to a uniform federal
approach.
Although the association of the high-profile former Hollywood star
Schwarzenegger played a large role in the increased interest in redistricting
commissions, other factors are at play. Also influencing the increased interest
in nonpartisan redistricting commissions has been the Supreme Court’s
decision to take several cases that draw into question the constitutionality of
partisan gerrymandering. The Court has avoided directly ruling on the issue
twice. In both Vieth v. Jubelirer71 and League of United Latin American
Citizens v. Perry,72 the Court refused to intervene in state redistricting plans
that were alleged to be unconstitutional partisan gerrymanders. Because it is
difficult to imagine a more blatant example of partisan gerrymandering than
the plan at issue in Perry,73 the pressure to adopt solutions through the
initiative process is likely to grow.74
In addition, political commentators have also focused on the lack of
competitiveness in most state legislative and House elections.75 In 2004,
for federal offices, presumably a state is more likely also to adopt this method of redistricting
for state legislative offices. See Michael P. McDonald, A Comparative Analysis of Redistricting
Institutions in the United States, 2001-02, 4 ST. POL. & POL’Y Q. 371, 380-81 (2004) (showing
that Indiana is the only state to use a commission for House seats but not for state legislative
offices).
71. 541 U.S. 267 (2004).
72. 126 S. Ct. 2594 (2006).
73. For a description of the politics behind the Texas plan, see Perry, 126 S. Ct. at 2628-31
(Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Oklahoma became a player in the Texas
saga as Democrats fled across the Red River to deny the state legislature a quorum and delay
adopting a redistricting proposal that heavily favored Republicans. Democrats made multiple
attempts to deny the legislature a quorum, from fleeing to Ardmore, Oklahoma, to “vacationing”
in New Mexico. See Kelley Shannon, Congressional Redistricting Flap Rages in Texas, DAILY
OKLAHOMAN (Oklahoma City), Oct. 12, 2003, at A17; David Zizzo, Texas Lawmakers Enjoy
Ardmore Hospitality, DAILY OKLAHOMAN (Oklahoma City), May 14, 2003, at A1.
74. See, e.g., Editorial, Let Voters Fix a Gerrymander, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Dec. 19,
2005, at 8 (arguing that voters, not the Court, should combat partisan gerrymandering and
noting the role of the initiative process).
75. See, e.g., Sam Hirsch, The United States House of Unrepresentatives: What Went
Wrong in the Latest Round of Congressional Redistricting, 2 ELECTION L.J. 179, 183 (2003);
Richard H. Pildes, Foreword: The Constitutionalization of Democratic Politics, 118 HARV. L.
REV. 28, 63-64 (2004); David S. Broder, No Vote Necessary, WASH. POST, Nov. 11, 2004, at
A37; Nicholas D. Kristof, No More Sham Elections, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 20, 2004, at A19; see
also Bruce I. Oppenheimer, Deep Red and Blue Congressional Districts: The Causes and
Consequences of Declining Party Competitiveness, in CONGRESS RECONSIDERED 135, 143
(Lawrence C. Dodd & Bruce I. Oppenheimer eds., 8th ed. 2004) (making a similar point with
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fewer than thirty-six races for the House of Representatives were real
contests.76 In California in 2004, not a single seat in the Assembly or Senate
changed parties,77 and one strongly suspects that nearly all of the same 153
state lawmakers would have returned to Sacramento but for term limits. The
experience with redistricting commissions in the handful of states that uses
them does not suggest that commissions usher in radical alterations of
elections or single-handedly bring back vibrant competition.78 But it is a
reform that promises some change in political dynamics, and it seems less
likely to be considered absent hybrid democracy. A hybrid system allows the
reform to be adopted by some states, through the initiative process or threat
of initiative, and the resulting attention then can place the topic on the national
agenda to cause change in states without the initiative process.
It is important not to overstate the value of hybrid democracy in allowing
consideration and adoption of electoral reforms. After all, nonpartisan
redistricting and election commissions are common in Europe, which does not
have a robust hybrid system.79 The Persily and Cully Anderson study suggests
that differences in state electoral systems may be more a product of political
culture than of the initiative process,80 although surely those two things —
political culture and hybrid democracy — are inherently related and their
effects are hard to separate. It is equally important to understand the

respect to the 2000 elections).
76. See Bruce E. Cain, Karin MacDonald & Michael McDonald, From Equality to
Fairness: The Path of Political Reform Since Baker v. Carr, in PARTY LINES: COMPETITION,
PARTISANSHIP, AND CONGRESSIONAL REDISTRICTING 6, 19 (Thomas E. Mann & Bruce E. Cain
eds., 2005) (stating that 10% or less of the 2002 and 2004 elections for House seats were
competitive); Mann, supra note 65, at 4.
77. See Editorial, Serving the Pols, Not the People, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 10, 2004, at B10.
78. See Thomas E. Mann, Redistricting Reform: What is Desirable? Possible?, in PARTY
LINES: COMPETITION, PARTISANSHIP, AND CONGRESSIONAL REDISTRICTING, supra note 75, at
92, 107-09; McDonald, supra note 70, at 371; Jamie Carson & Michael H. Crespin, Comparing
the Effects of Legislative, Commission, and Judicial Redistricting Plans on U.S. House
Elections, 1972-2002, (Mar. 11-13, 2004) (unpublished paper presented at the Western Political
Science Association Annual Meeting); see also Gene R. Nichol, Jr., The Practice of
Redistricting, 72 U. COLO. L. REV. 1029, 1030 (2001) (observing “intensely political” process
with respect to appointment of politicians, but less for appointments of judges).
79. See Samuel Issacharoff, Judging Politics: The Elusive Quest for Judicial Review of
Political Fairness, 71 TEX. L. REV. 1643, 1694 (1992); Pildes, supra note 74, at 78-80; see also
Christopher S. Elmendorf, Representation Reinforcement Through Advisory Commissions: The
Case of Election Law, 80 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1366 (2005) (drawing on European and other
international experience to advocate consideration of a permanent advisory commission on
electoral reform).
80. See Persily & Cully Anderson, supra note 62, at 1001, 1033.
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limitations of hybrid democracy as a method to improve electoral institutions
and to circumvent legislator self-interest.
B. The Peril of Hybrid Democracy: Critically Weakening Representative
Institutions
Any policy-making process that applies generally and is formulated well in
advance of particular decisions can usually be used to adopt reforms that one
believes are good for democracy and reforms that one believes harm
democratic institutions. The initiative process has been used by groups to
enact changes in democratic institutions that I believe have been unwise, such
as term limits and limitations on the ability of legislatures to raise taxes, as
well as reforms I view as positive, such as redistricting commissions and
ethics reform. In some cases, the experiments adopted by initiative have
worked well, and in other cases, they have failed. Often it is not entirely clear
when a reform is adopted whether its consequences will be a net
improvement; however, one of the strengths of a federal system is the ability
of states to try new approaches and to learn from their experiences and those
of other states. The costs of reforms that prove unwise can be reduced
through the proposals described above to allow legislative modification of
statutory initiatives and to sunset constitutional initiatives. Of course, sunset
provisions also reduce the possible advantages of beneficial initiatives because
they limit their durability, but presumably reforms that are widely perceived
to be successful will be easier to reenact.
The real concern with hybrid democracy is not that it allows people to make
unwise decisions as well as good ones, but that laws adopted through the
initiative process more often than not will weaken representative institutions
rather than strengthen them. In fact, some would argue that direct democracy
necessarily undermines representative institutions. This is a serious charge
because, even in states with active direct democracy, most governance
decisions will continue to be made by elected and appointed officials. If their
ability to govern effectively is systematically and substantially damaged by
initiatives, popular referendums and recalls, then the value of hybrid
democracy is called into question.
The reasoning of these critics is that people turn to initiatives because they
are frustrated with their representatives; thus, they will mostly enact
legislation that reduces the power of elected officials. Even initiatives that are
heralded by the reform community as beneficial changes to democratic
structures — such as redistricting reform and campaign finance reform —
operate to limit the discretion of legislators to act in self-interested ways. The
argument made by opponents of direct democracy cannot simply be that
initiatives limit legislative discretion; often they do. The argument must be
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that initiatives more often limit discretion needed for effective representative
government than they limit discretion to act in the interests of legislators
themselves or special interests to the detriment of the public interest. In short,
the case must be made that the costs of initiatives to the vitality and strength
of representative democracy outweigh the benefits.
For example, critics of direct democracy claim that policies enacted by
initiative have exacerbated the budget difficulties of states like California.
The concern is that initiatives will tend to reduce the flexibility of lawmakers
to modify budgets in response to economic changes and to reorder government
priorities. When lawmakers begin to work on the state’s annual budget, they
find that a substantial amount of revenue has already been committed to
particular projects by initiatives. Laura Tyson has stated, without any
empirical support, that 70% of California’s budget has been earmarked by
initiatives,81 and lawmakers in other states say they are worried about a similar
“Californi-fication” of their budgets.82 Other critics point to term limits,
which are almost entirely a product of initiative, as responsible for a
substantial reduction in the ability of legislators to reach compromises and
govern competently.83
Certainly, there is reason to be concerned that one inevitable effect of
hybrid democracy is a significant weakening of the representative
component. However, elected officials bear some responsibility for this
feature of modern hybrid democracy: the resurgence of direct democracy in
the 1970s partially resulted from public disgust with and distrust of
representative institutions because of the perceived — and actual — failure
of elected officials to respond to voter preferences. Voter frustration with
representative institutions continues to drive election reform by initiative.
For example, recent efforts to change the primary system in California,
including the adoption of the short-lived blanket primary, are reactions to the
unwillingness of the two major parties to adopt internal reforms that would
present voters with different choices in the general election.
A recent election concretely demonstrated the effect of the major parties’
failure to nominate candidates that can energize voters. The prospect of
81. Laura D’Andrea Tyson, A New Governor Won’t Fix What Ails California, BUS. WK.,
Sept. 22, 2003, at 24.
82. See, e.g., Bill Cotterell, Panel Seeks to Make It Harder to Change Florida Constitution
by Petition, TALLAHASSEE DEMOCRAT, Dec. 9, 2003 (quoting Florida lawmakers in hearings to
consider changes in initiative process that would make initiatives more difficult to qualify for
the ballot and to pass).
83. For an exhaustive examination of the effect of term limits in California, see BRUCE E.
CAIN & THAD KOUSSER, ADAPTING TO TERM LIMITS: RECENT EXPERIENCES AND NEW
DIRECTIONS (2004).
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choosing between Gray Davis and Bill Simon in the 2002 gubernatorial
election in California led to voter alienation and very low turnout.84
Ironically, this low turnout made it easier for those supporting a recall of
Davis to collect enough signatures to place the question of retaining him
before the voters less than a year after his reelection because the number of
signatures required is a percentage of the total voting in the last gubernatorial
election.85 Opponents of the recall attacked it as undermining representative
institutions;86 blame should have been shared by the entrenched political
players who refused to adopt reforms that responded to voters’ legitimate
concerns about the quality of candidates. The two parts of hybrid democracy
are related; each reacts to the other. When the behavior of elected officials
leads to disengagement from representative institutions, the public may be
more likely to support initiatives aimed at elected officials.
Moreover, criticism of the effect of initiatives on the performance of
representative institutions is typically overstated. For example, Tyson’s claim
that 70% of the California budget is earmarked by initiatives is certainly
exaggerated.87 The most comprehensive study of the California budget puts
the figure well below this level, revealing that only 32% of the state’s 2003-04
Budget was constrained by popular initiatives.88 Furthermore, the mandated
spending is largely the product of one initiative, Proposition 98, that requires
the money be spent for grades K-12 and community college education.89 To
be sure, even this amount of earmarking can be problematic in difficult
84. See Carla Marinucci, The White House Question; Davis Is Only Large-State Democrat
Governor, but His Stock Has Slipped, S.F. CHRON., Nov. 7, 2002, at A3 (“Turnout for
Tuesday’s election was an estimated 44.8 percent, which would be the worst general election
turnout in California history . . . .”)
85. See Garrett, Democracy in the Wake, supra note 39, at 242. See generally CAL. CONST.
art. II, § 14(b).
86. Lisa Petrillo, Jesse Jackson Decries Recall Election; Democracy Being Undercut, He
Says, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIB., Oct. 6, 2003, at B3; John Wildermuth, Dean, Davis Say Recall
Undermines Democracy, S.F. CHRON., Sept. 7, 2003, at A21.
87. Others have used similar figures but with regard to the amount of the budget determined
by initiatives and federal mandates. See, e.g., John W. Ellwood & Mary Sprague, Options for
Reforming the California State Budget Process, in CONSTITUTIONAL REFORM IN CALIFORNIA:
MAKING STATE GOVERNMENT MORE EFFECTIVE AND RESPONSIVE 329, 337, 348 (Bruce E. Cain
& Roger G. Noll eds., 1995) (stating that 88% of the state’s budget is earmarked by some
source, including federal mandates and initiatives, and that 60% of the General Fund
expenditures are earmarked by Proposition 98 and the three-strikes initiative).
88. John G. Matsusaka, Direct Democracy and Fiscal Gridlock: Have Voter Initiatives
Paralyzed the California Budget?, 5 ST. POL. & POL’Y Q. 248, 248 (2005).
89. Id. at 252; see also Classroom Instructional Improvement and Accountability Act, Cal.
Proposition 98 (1988), amended by Traffic Congestion Relief and Spending Limit Act of 1990,
Cal. Proposition 111.
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budgetary times and deny lawmakers necessary flexibility. Indeed, one of the
initiatives that Governor Schwarzenegger placed on the ballot in 2005 was a
budget reform proposal that would have weakened the requirements of
Proposition 98.90 Of course, looking only at the amount of earmarked money
does not provide the full story of the effect of initiatives on the legislature’s
ability to budget. Other initiatives limit the ability of the legislature to raise
money to fund new programs, and term-limited legislators are less able to
reach the compromises to enact a budget in a timely fashion than legislators
with more experience. In short, the effect of initiatives on budgeting is
complicated — and the experience of the federal government suggests that
budget policy can become inflexible and poorly run without the influence of
initiatives.
No easy solution exists to reduce the threat that direct democracy poses to
the health of representative institutions. If one thought the costs to
representative government substantially outweighed the benefits of hybrid
democracy, eliminating direct elements of our system might be justified. It
does not seem, however, that the case has been made; critics do not pay
sufficient attention to the power of initiatives to reform representative
institutions in ways that improve their performance and responsiveness.
Moreover, even if critics persuade scholars and policy elites that direct
democracy is reducing welfare overall, eliminating the initiative process is
very unlikely to be accepted by the people. Polls consistently demonstrate that
citizens like the initiative process and trust its outcomes more than they trust
legislation enacted by their representatives.91 Moreover, in the United States
and around the world, the trend is toward increasing the influence on
governance exerted by the initiative and referendum. The vast majority of
new constitutions in Europe have some element of direct democracy,92 and
efforts to substantially erode the process in U.S. states and cities that allow
popular involvement in lawmaking rarely succeed. Throwing out all direct
elements of our hybrid system is an extreme reaction that denies voters an
ability to play a role in shaping institutions of governance within our
90. California Live Within Our Means Act, Cal. Proposition 76 (2005), available at
http://www.ss.ca.gov/elections/bp_nov05/voter_info_pdf/text76.pdf.
91. See, e.g., MARK BALDASSARE, CALIFORNIANS AND THEIR GOVERNMENT: PPIC
STATEWIDE SURVEY 17 (2004) (stating that 74% of California voters think the initiative process
is a “good thing” and that 59% of them think that policy made through initiatives is better than
policy made by elected officials); Jack Citrin & Jonathan Cohen, Viewing the Recall from Above
and Below, in ESSAYS ON THE CALIFORNIA RECALL 68, 74-82 (Shaun Bowler & Bruce E. Cain
eds., 2006).
92. Bruno Kaufmann, A Comparative Evaluation of Initiative & Referendum in 32
European States, in DIRECT DEMOCRACY IN EUROPE 3 (Bruno Kaufmann & M. Dane Waters
eds., 2004).
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democratic framework. The better response is to work toward thoughtful
reform, and to understand that any process of government can be used to enact
legislation that we like and legislation that we dislike.
C. Avoiding the Peril of Binary Decision Making: Using Commissions to
Augment the Initiative Process
Decisions about the design of democratic institutions can be complex. Not
only is each particular reform proposal complicated and likely to interact in
multifaceted and sometimes unexpected ways with other parts of the political
system, but design decisions may also require that one choose among several
options simultaneously. The format of decision making in the initiative
process in the United States is not conducive to this type of multi-factored
analysis. The first limitation of the initiative is the binary nature of the
process. Voters are asked to vote “yes” or “no” on one option that is
compared, in most cases, to the status quo. Only in a few instances will there
be more than one question on the ballot relating to the same issue. Even in
those cases, the choice must be made in a binary way on each proposal,
compared only to the status quo, without any way for voters to signal how
they might make trade-offs among the alternatives.93 Rather than empowering
voters, the presence of multiple questions on the same ballot about the same
topic often means that the status quo is retained because confused voters vote
“no” on all the questions. Indeed, opponents of reforms proposed through
direct democracy sometimes qualify competing initiatives merely to ensure the
defeat of the first reform; they are largely indifferent about whether their
proposal passes because they are relatively happy with the status quo.94
Furthermore, single subject rules usually apply to initiatives. These rules
are intended to reduce voter confusion and to avoid forcing voters to accept
a policy they oppose in order to get a change that they strongly favor.95 But
single-subject requirements also limit the scope of any particular reform
proposed by initiative even if it is more sensible to consider it as part of a
comprehensive reform.

93. Others have indicted direct democracy because it forces voters to make difficult
decisions in this binary fashion without considering the trade-offs inherent in governance. See
THOMPSON, JUST ELECTIONS, supra note 51, at 139; Sherman J. Clark, A Populist Critique of
Direct Democracy, 112 HARV. L. REV. 434 (1998).
94. See Elizabeth Garrett, Who Chooses the Rules?, 4 ELECTION L.J. 139, 144 (2005)
[hereinafter Garrett, Who Chooses?].
95. See Daniel H. Lowenstein, Initiatives and the New Single Subject Rule, 1 ELECTION L.J.
35 (2002) (discussing courts’ greater use of single subject rules to invalidate laws enacted by
initiative).
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The current design of hybrid democracy is not inevitable, however; it could
be changed to allow more complex decision making. Careful thought is
required before adopting any design change; most voters will never spend the
time required to become experts on policy choices, and the political
environment must be shaped so that it allows them to decide competently on
the basis of a few voting cues. Reform is nonetheless still possible, for
example, by combining an independent commission with an initiative, much
as New Zealand did when it adopted a proportional election system for its
Parliament.96 In 1986, the Royal Commission on the Electoral System
analyzed the existing first-past-the-post (FPTP) system and alternatives, and
it recommended changing to a mixed-member proportional (MMP) system
based on the German approach.97 It was not clear at this point whether the
Commission’s recommendations were necessarily the prelude to a popular
referendum, or whether any such referendum would be binding.98 The report,
however, served as a focal point for reform and placed the issue of electoral
reform on the policy agenda, making it impossible for politicians to avoid a
popular vote on reform. Thus, in 1992, voters were asked in a non-binding
referendum whether they wanted to keep the status quo, and then which of
four other electoral systems they would prefer instead. In this advisory vote,
the voters clearly signaled a desire to get rid of FPTP and to adopt MMP.
After a year of further discussion and campaigning, voters were presented the
binding binary choice between FPTP and MMP, and 54% of them chose MMP
in an election in which 85% of eligible voters participated.99
A different sort of entity has been combined with direct democracy in
British Columbia to consider sweeping electoral reform of its FPTP system.
In April 2003, the government created a Citizens’ Assembly on Electoral
Reform, consisting of 160 members — one man and one woman from each
electoral district and two aboriginal members.100 The Assembly, which was
96. See Garrett, Who Chooses?, supra note 94, at 145.
97. GEOFFREY PALMER & MATTHEW PALMER, BRIDLED POWER: NEW ZEALAND’S
CONSTITUTION AND GOVERNMENT 13 (4th ed. 2004).
98. See WILLIAM KEITH JACKSON & ALAN MCROBIE, NEW ZEALAND ADOPTS
PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION: ACCIDENT? DESIGN? EVOLUTION? 46-49 (1998) (describing
how the issue of popular referendum was raised, perhaps mistakenly, by the Prime Minister in
a debate); id. at 125-34 (describing the political process that resulted in the two-referendum
format).
99. PALMER & PALMER, supra note 97, at 13. Findings from the California recall, with its
two-part, relatively complicated ballot, suggest that voters can handle more complexity than the
current binary format for initiatives in the states. See R. Michael Alvarez, D. Roderick Kiewiet
& Betsy Sinclair, Rational Voters and the Recall Election, in ESSAYS ON THE CALIFORNIA
RECALL, supra note 91, at 87.
100. See Keith Archer, Redefining Electoral Democracy in Canada, 3 ELECTION L.J. 545
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provided a staff and budget and held public hearings, assessed the electoral
system and compared it to approaches in other countries.101 In December
2004, the Assembly adopted a proposal to change British Columbia’s system
to a single transferable vote system that would allow voters to rank candidates
and would move any vote not necessary to elect a candidate to the voter’s next
preferred candidate.102 The question of whether to adopt the Citizens’
Assembly’s recommendation was submitted to the voters in a referendum in
May 2005.103 To pass, the referendum had to receive both a supermajority of
60% of all those voting and a simple majority in 60% of the seventy-nine
electoral districts.104 The referendum failed, but it only barely missed the
threshold when it received over 57% support and achieved a simple majority
in all but two districts.105 As often occurs when a referendum receives
majority support but fails because of supermajority requirements,106 the
discussion about reforming the FPTP system in British Columbia is
continuing.107
I do not want to suggest that this combination of commission or citizens’
assembly and popular votes, perhaps on questions phrased in non-binary ways,
is required for every decision presented to the people. For example, when the
legislature puts a proposal on the ballot, lawmakers have engaged in the
(2004). The website of the Citizens’ Assembly is http://www.citizensassembly.bc.ca/public.
A similar assembly is under consideration in Ontario. See Press Release, Office of the Premier
of Ont., Ontarians To Have a Say on Electoral Reform: Citizens’ Assembly Will Re-examine
How We Elect MMPs (Nov. 18, 2004), available at http://www.premier.gov.on.ca/news/
Product.asp?ProductID=251; see also ETHAN LIEB, DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA:
A PROPOSAL FOR A POPULAR BRANCH OF GOVERNMENT (2004) (proposing an institution like
a citizens’ assembly in a creative proposal to make direct democracy more deliberative).
101. See B.C. CITIZENS’ ASSEMBLY ON ELECTORAL REFORM, MAKING EVERY VOTE COUNT:
THE CASE FOR ELECTORAL REFORM IN BRITISH COLUMBIA 11 (2004), available at http://www.
citizensassembly.bc.ca/resources/final_report.pdf.
102. Id. at 6.
103. See British Columbia Referendum Information Office, Election Reform,
http://www.gov.bc.ca/referendum_info/ (last visited May 28, 2006).
104. See Elections BC, Final Referendum Results: Referendum on Electoral Reform,
http://www.elections.bc.ca/elections/ge2005/finalrefresults.htm (last visited May 28, 2006).
105. See id.
106. See Elizabeth Garrett, Issues in Implementing Referendums in Israel: A Comparative
Study in Direct Democracy, 2 CHI. J. INT'L L. 159, 165 (2001) (discussing the situation with
regard to Scottish devolution, which passed in a second referendum).
107. See Andru McCracken, Premier Addresses Electoral Reform, ROBSON VALLEY TIMES,
Sept. 21, 2005, http://www.robsonvalleytimes.com/index.php?option=com_content &task=view
&id=197&Itemid=0; Gordon Campbell, Premier of B.C., Speech from the Throne on the
Opening of the First Session of the Thirty-Eighth Parliament 24-29 (September 12, 2005)
(promising another referendum regarding electoral reform by November 2008), available at
http://www.legis.gov.bc.ca/38th1st/Throne_Speech_2005_1st_38th.pdf.
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process of deliberation, and they have winnowed down the alternatives and
thought about the relevant trade-offs. In the area of electoral reform, however,
use of commissions seems particularly appropriate.108 Lawmakers have a
conflict of interest when it comes to designing the institutions through which
they seek and retain office, so they should not be the primary decision makers
about larger structural issues. Leaving such decisions entirely to the people
without some guidance from experts, however, is problematic because
comprehensive electoral and governance reforms can be too complex for the
traditional initiative process in the United States. An awareness that we
operate in a hybrid democracy — with representative institutions, direct
elements, and the potential for special commissions and assemblies — should
allow more creative solutions to the perils of the initiative process, while
retaining its promise as a means to consider and enact reforms opposed by
entrenched political players with a stake in the status quo.
III. Governing in a Hybrid Democracy: Empowering the Majority?
As the preceding discussion of electoral reform through initiatives suggests,
the presence of a robust initiative process can influence the traditional
legislative process so that more legislation reflects the preferences of the
median voter, rather than interest groups with intense and often outlying
preferences.109 This has been called the indirect effect of direct democracy.110
Accordingly, groups advocating a position that is likely to gain majority
support if presented to the people on the ballot, but who are stymied in the
legislature, can threaten to qualify an initiative. This threat can change the
bargaining dynamics in the legislature and allow a compromise to be enacted
through the representative branches. For example, in 1996, Reed Hastings, a
wealthy Silicon Valley entrepreneur, led a group in an effort to establish
charter schools and found they were blocked by powerful teacher unions in the
California legislature.111 So they spent $3.5 million to fill petitions with 1.2
million signatures and raised an additional $12 million for a campaign war
chest.112 Their success in signature gathering and fundraising provided them
108. See generally Elmendorf, supra note 79.
109. See Elisabeth R. Gerber, Legislative Response to the Threat of Popular Initiatives, 40
AM. J. POL. SCI. 99 (1996); Matsusaka, supra note 55, at 192-93.
110. See GERBER, supra note 3, at 121-36.
111. Daniel M. Weintraub, Charter-School Deal Reached: Backers Agree to Keep Measure
off the Ballot if Ok’d by Legislature, Wilson, ORANGE COUNTY REG., Apr. 29, 1998, at A1.
112. See Zachary Coile, Fear of Initiative Spurs Charter School Bill in Legislature:
Lawmakers Respond Overwhelmingly to Millionaire’s Clout, S.F. EXAMINER, May 1, 1998, at
A1; Peter Schrag, Technetters: The Silicon Valley Mystique, SACRAMENTO BEE, May 20, 1998,
at B7.
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credibility when they began to bargain again with lawmakers.113 Because
legislators understood that the initiative would likely pass if presented to the
people, they were willing to work with Hastings’s group to reach a
compromise.114 A charter schools bill was enacted, an indirect consequence
of the initiative process.115
This ability to threaten to qualify a ballot measure depends on two
conditions: the resources to gain ballot access and an issue that is likely to
receive majority support at the polls. The latter condition means that the
initiative threat tends to push legislative outcomes toward majoritarian
preferences and could be a healthy counterweight to the tendency of the
traditional legislative process to favor relatively small groups with intense
preferences. Hybrid democracy might therefore represent a balance between
a process that gives significant voice to intensity of preferences
(representative democracy) and one that favors majoritarian outcomes (direct
democracy).
There are two problems with this rosy view, however. The first one I will
mention but not deal with thoroughly in this Lecture. It is not clear that hybrid
democracy is sufficiently balanced to appropriately protect the rights of all
minority groups in a democracy. The majoritarian aspect of direct democracy
was seen as a serious weakness by Madison, for example, who argued for
purely representative institutions to guard against the passions of majoritarian
factions.116 Well-organized and well-funded minorities probably can use their
funds to defeat initiatives that threaten their interests;117 the real worry is that
minorities that lack money and power may be systematically harmed by the
initiative process. In recent years, initiatives that target immigrants, felons,
and gays and lesbians have been passed by substantial margins because they
appeal to the prejudices of the majority and are enacted in a process with little
protection for those who lack power and resources.118 Of course, these groups
do not necessarily fare much better in the representative process, which has
113. See Weintraub, supra note 111, at A1.
114. See Coile, supra note 112, at A1.
115. See Elizabeth Garrett, Money, Agenda Setting, and Direct Democracy, 77 TEX. L. REV.
1845, 1860 (1999) (detailing this story).
116. THE FEDERALIST No. 10, at 77 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
117. See Elizabeth Garrett & Elisabeth R. Gerber, Money in the Initiative and Referendum
Process: Evidence of Its Effects and Prospects for Reform, in THE BATTLE OVER CITIZEN
LAWMAKING 73, 79-80 (2001) (surveying literature demonstrating that heavy one-sided
spending to defeat an initiative is disproportionately successful).
118. See supra text accompanying notes 11-16 (discussing initiatives targeted at gays and
lesbians); see also, e.g., “Three Strikes Initiative,” Cal. Proposition 184 (1994); Cal. Proposition
187 (1994) (denying public services to undocumented workers), available at http://www.
americanpatrol.com/REFERENCE/prop187text.html.
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also passed laws hostile to them and others without significant electoral clout.
However, the representative process has safeguards that slow enactment of
policies and that empower representatives of a determined minority, especially
in blocking legislation. These safeguards, such as the vetogates of
committees, requirements of bicameralism and presentment, and
supermajority voting requirements in some circumstances, are unavailable in
direct democracy. The safeguard for minority interests burdened by
oppressive initiatives is the courts, which have been willing to strike down
some of the ballot measures, such as those denying undocumented workers
access to government services or some aimed at restricting the rights of gays
and lesbians.119 It is not clear, however, that the representative process
combined with judicial protection is substantial enough to balance the
majoritarian aspects of the initiative process, particularly when harnessed by
populist demagogues who appeal to the worst instincts in voters.
There is another, related way to look at the “cost” of majoritarianism that
results from direct democracy. Direct democracy generally empowers the
median voter, while representative democracy allows groups with intense
preferences a larger role in policy making.120 Depending on the intensity of
the preferences held by the minority and majority, privileging the median
voter may reduce overall welfare. Hybrid democracy, and the bargaining in
the legislative process that occurs in the shadow of the initiative process,
however, might allow a healthy balance between the preferences of the
median voter and strongly held preferences of a minority. More theoretical
and empirical work is needed to determine whether the balance is indeed
healthy — that is, whether hybrid systems allow minorities to prevail when
such a result maximizes overall welfare but blocks their success when the
policy they seek results in larger societal costs than the benefits they obtain.
The concern with respect to unorganized minorities or groups lacking both the
resources to meaningfully influence the representative process and the
numbers to prevail in initiatives is that their preferences will be systematically
ignored and undervalued. Thus, the majority will always prevail even when

119. See, e.g., Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996) (holding that a constitutional
amendment passed by referendum in Colorado, which prohibited state action that was protective
of homosexuals, violated the Equal Protection Clause); League of United Latin Am. Citizens
v. Wilson, 997 F. Supp. 1244 (C.D. Cal. 1997) (finding that most of California’s Proposition
187, which denied public services to undocumented workers, was in conflict with federal law).
120. Arthur Lupia & John G. Matsusaka, Direct Democracy: New Approaches to Old
Questions, 7 ANN. REV. POL. SCI. 463, 476-77 (2004); see also Thomas Stratmann, Logrolling,
in PERSPECTIVES ON P UBLIC CHOICE 322, 325 (D.C. Mueller ed., 1997) (describing how
logrolling in legislatures allows those with intense preferences to obtain policy outcomes).
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society on the whole is better off with the policy favored strongly by the
minority.
The second flaw in the ideal version of a balanced hybrid democracy lies
in the realities of the first condition: the process of qualifying measures for the
ballot. Although grassroots groups may be able to qualify initiatives with
armies of volunteers, the sure route to ballot access is money. A group that
can pay between fifty cents and ten dollars per signature is guaranteed access
to the ballot.121 The reality that money is a sufficient condition for ballot
access means that the agenda of the initiative process is set by wealthy groups
and individuals. Although Reed Hastings could not have successfully
threatened lawmakers unless charter schools was an issue with majority
support, we cannot be certain that a majority of Californians would have
agreed with him that his charter-schools proposal was the most pressing
educational reform. If the people had been allowed more say in setting the
agenda, one suspects that issues like class size, the condition of facilities, perpupil spending, and teacher accountability would have ranked ahead of charter
schools.122 In other words, the initiative process may favor majoritarian
outcomes but only on the questions that well-funded interests want to ask the
public.
This dynamic may be different, however, when elected officials are
wielding the initiative threat. Unlike a wealthy entrepreneur or a leader of a
well-funded group, an elected official is accountable to the voters and thus
may be more likely to elevate issues to the policy agenda that concern most of
her constituents. A politician who uses the threat of initiative to change
bargaining dynamics among the branches of government not only deploys a
tool that favors majoritarian outcomes but she may also use it on issues that
matter to her constituents. Of course, governors and other elected officials
can also be susceptible to the entreaties of well-funded and well-organized
groups when choosing which issues to champion. Arnold Schwarzenegger has
raised most of his campaign money from business interests such as financial
institutions, information technology firms, real estate developers, oil and gas
companies, health care and drug companies, auto dealers, and retailers;123
presumably, they exercise some influence over his decisions about agenda121. See generally ANDREW M. GLOGER, INITIATIVE & REFERENDUM INST., IRI REP. 2006-1,
PAID PETITIONERS AFTER PRETE (2006), available at http://www.iandrinstitute.org/REPORT%
202006-1%20Paid%20Petitioners.pdf.
122. A study by the Public Policy Institute of California in 2005, for example, found that
class size, curriculum, and teacher quality were the most important issues to adults in the state.
See MARK BALDASSARE, PPIC STATEWIDE SURVEY APRIL 2005: SPECIAL SURVEY ON
EDUCATION 10 (2005), available at http://www.ppic.org/content/pubs/S_405MBS.pdf.
123. See Garrett, Hybrid Democracy, supra note 2, at 1106; Hasen, supra note 39, at 901.
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setting. However, the Governor’s statewide constituency and political
ambition may lead him to be more concerned with majoritarian preferences
than legislators who represent smaller geographic areas, and certainly he is
more accountable than policy entrepreneurs like Reed Hastings. At the least,
the dynamics of initiative threats used to govern are significantly different
when the person making the threat faces reelection, rather than when the tool
is used by the leader of an interest group or a rich person whose hobby is
politics.
A. Arnold Schwarzenegger and Hybrid Democracy: A Promising Start?124
Politicians have used the threat of initiative, as well as the initiative process
itself, to enact policies in the past,125 but never to the extent that it has been
used recently in California. The modern politician who embodies hybrid
democracy — with its promise and its perils — is Arnold Schwarzenegger.
His systematic use of direct democracy to govern is qualitatively different
from anything seen before in California or elsewhere. After a brief review of
Schwarzenegger’s use of hybrid democracy since he took office, I will turn to
the perils of this approach. As we have learned in California, even a politician
with all the advantages of Schwarzenegger cannot use this tactic over the long
term to enact major and controversial policies. It is simply not a sustainable
method of governing. When the threat fails and the executive must turn to the
people, he faces the risk of loss at the polls, thereby decreasing the credibility
of future threats. Even when he succeeds, the policy enacted suffers from the
problems of initiatives generally. That is, it is enacted in an extremely durable
form that cannot easily be changed over time to deal with unforeseen
consequences or to correct mistakes in the original drafting. Moreover, if the
strategy is used as a primary method of governing, politicians find themselves
in a perpetual campaign, diverting their energy from the task of day-to-day
governance.
Schwarzenegger’s first foray into the political realm, largely to test the
waters for a gubernatorial candidacy, was his support in 2002 of Proposition
124. Much of this discussion is drawn from a longer analysis in Garrett, Hybrid Democracy,
supra note 2.
125. See, e.g., Senator Bob Graham, Keynote Address at USC-Caltech for the Study of Law
and Politics Conference: The 2004 Election: What Does It Mean for Campaigns and
Governance? (Oct. 8, 2004), available at http://lawweb.usc.edu/cslp/pages/conference.html
(follow video hyperlink “Keynote Address by Senator Bob Graham (D-FL)”) (discussing how
Graham and others enacted higher education reform through the initiative even though the
sitting Governor and Republicans opposed it). Of course, executives have long used populist
rhetoric and threats to go over the heads of the legislators to the people to increase their
bargaining position. The initiative makes the threat more potent because if the tool is used
successfully, the governor can actually enact the law he supports.
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49, requiring funds be spent on after-school programs.126 Not only did he lend
his name to the campaign, but he also spent $1.1 million of his own money to
pass the measure.127 This initiative, which passed easily, is the kind of cryptoinitiative Kousser and McCubbins indict: it was designed primarily for
Schwarzenegger’s political gain rather than to effect policy change. The
initiative provided no funding to after-school programs unless there was a
surplus available after other education funds had been disbursed; indeed,
experts believe that funds will not be available for these programs until
2007.128 There was virtually no opposition to this proposal, which was
structured both to resonate positively with voters and to demonstrate to an
important interest group — the educational community — that Schwarzenegger
would support their interests.
After his first success in hybrid democracy, Schwarzenegger began to
watch for an opportunity to run for governor, a tricky proposition despite his
popularity because his relatively liberal social views would hurt him in a
closed Republican primary. The right wing of his Party distrusted him on
several grounds: his support of gay rights, women’s reproductive freedom, and
environmental issues; his marriage to a member of the Kennedy family; and
his inability to prove that he was a fiscal conservative who would oppose all
tax increases. The recall was a tailor-made opportunity for Schwarzenegger
to run for office.129 He was able to bypass the primary system and go straight
to a general election. He could run against an extremely unpopular and
uncharismatic governor who had barely managed to defeat an even more
uncharismatic Republican opponent in the 2002 election.
Schwarzenegger’s celebrity status and personal wealth gave him substantial
advantages in the truncated recall campaign and allowed him to rise to the top
of a crowded field of 135 candidates. Schwarzenegger spent about $10.5
million of his own money,130 a figure that his closest competitor, Cruz
Bustamante, had to try to match by rapidly raising money from individuals
through contributions limited to $21,200 each.131 Although Bustamante
126. See After School Education and Safety Act, Cal. Proposition 49 (1992); David L.
Schecter, Rights of Removal: Recall Politics in the Modern Era 22 (Sept. 5, 2004) (unpublished
paper presented at the 2004 American Political Science Association Annual Meeting held in
Chicago, Ill.), available at http://convention2.allacademic.com/index.php?cmd=apsa04 (use
“Quick Search” feature to search for “Right of Removal”; then click on the hyperlink for the
article).
127. Schecter, supra note 126, at 22.
128. Carla Rivera, Schwarzenegger’s Initiative Unfunded, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 28, 2003, at B1.
129. For a discussion of the recall and its advantages for Schwarzenegger, see Garrett,
Democracy in the Wake, supra note 39, at 254-65.
130. See id. at 247.
131. See Dan Morain, Recall Campaigners Spend $88 Million, Despite Limits, L.A. TIMES,
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attempted to evade contribution limitations through his own use of hybrid
democracy — raising money to defeat an initiative on the recall ballot and
spending it on advertisements featuring Bustamante — he was never able to
generate the kind of money that Schwarzenegger had in his personal bank
account.132 Thus, hybrid democracy — the California statewide recall system —
propelled Schwarzenegger into the governor’s office and allowed him to avoid
many of the pitfalls of a traditional campaign and election.133
Schwarzenegger has continued to use hybrid democracy as the linchpin of
his approach to governing. His celebrity status ensures that he receives
intense media attention; he is the most successful fundraiser in California’s
history and, until 2005, he was tremendously popular with voters, including
Democrats and independents. Because of these qualities, his threats to
circumvent the legislature and take his proposals directly to the people were
credible and, for the first year or so of his governorship, forced lawmakers to
bargain with him and enact legislation he could support. Few other politicians
would be able to consistently and credibly make such threats.
In Schwarzenegger’s first State of the State Address, he warned legislators
that he would take workers’ compensation reform to the voters unless he
received a bill that he could accept by March 1,134 a deadline that was
subsequently relaxed. His victory in the recall election gave the threat some
credibility, and his position was substantially strengthened after a March
special election in which voters passed a $15 billion bond that the Governor
needed to survive an immediate budget crisis.135 This victory was impressive
because the bond proposal, which was linked to a second proposal requiring
a balanced budget, had initially received support from only about one-third of
the voters.136 After an aggressive campaign led by the Governor, the bond was
Feb. 4, 2004, at B6.
132. Garrett, Democracy in the Wake, supra note 39, at 248-49.
133. For example, the brief campaign period made it less likely that allegations of past
inappropriate behavior toward women would affect the viability of Schwarzenegger’s campaign.
See Gary Cohn, Carla Hall & Robert W. Welkos, Women Say Schwarzenegger Groped,
Humiliated Them, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 2, 2003, at A1 (presenting a story that broke only days
before Election Day and after many absentee ballots had been cast).
134. Arnold Schwarzenegger, Governor of Cal., State of the State Address (Jan. 6, 2004),
available at http://www.governor.ca.gov/state/govsite/gov_homepage.jsp (follow “Speeches”
hyperlink; then follow “2004" hyperlink; then follow “Governor Schwarzenegger’s State of the
State Address 01/06/2004" hyperlink).
135. See Rene Sanchez, Political Muscle: Schwarzenegger Demonstrates Strength with
Ballot Triumph, WASH. POST, Mar. 4, 2004, at A01. See generally Economic Recovery Bond
Act, Cal. Proposition 57 (2004), available at http://primary2004.ss.ca.gov/Returns/prop/00.htm
(follow “57" hyperlink; then follow “Text of Proposed Law” hyperlink).
136. Sanchez, supra note 135, at A01.
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passed by a decisive margin; 63% of those voting supported it.137 Although
this reversal in public opinion is noteworthy, victory was always likely
because Schwarzenegger faced no real opposition. Instead, he had the support
of virtually all political leaders in the state including Democratic Senator
Dianne Feinstein.138 Soon after the victory, the California legislature sent
workers’ compensation reform to the Governor’s desk for his signature.139
The threat of initiative backed up by success at the polls had succeeded in
breaking the legislative logjam that previously had blocked reform.
Schwarzenegger continued to govern during his first year by threat of
initiative. During budget negotiations in spring 2004, he had convinced Indian
tribes to contribute more money to the state in part because he threatened to
support initiatives circulated by gambling interests to take away the tribes’
monopoly.140 Part of the agreement with the tribes was that Schwarzenegger
would oppose the initiatives; he was so successful that the supporters of
Proposition 68, which would have eliminated the monopoly unless tribes
agreed to pay 25% of their revenues to the state, pulled out of the campaign
several weeks before the election after having spent $25 million.141
Schwarzenegger was active not only in the campaigns concerning the
gambling initiatives; he also took positions on twelve of the sixteen ballot
measures on the November 2004 ballot.142 His position prevailed in all but
two of the races, and those losses should not have significantly hurt his
reputation because he did not take a particularly public position on either.143
He supported the nonpartisan primary proposal late in the campaign and did
not include it in the slate mailer that the Republican Party mailed out listing
his positions; this ballot measure lost.144 Voters enacted Proposition 63,145
137. Cal. Sec’y of State, California Primary Election, Mar. 2, 2004: State Ballot Measures,
Statewide Returns, http://primary2004.ss.ca.gov/Returns/prop/00.htm (last visited July 9, 2006)
(showing Proposition 57 (Economic Recovery Bond) winning with over 63% support and
Proposition 58 (Balanced Budget) winning with 71% support).
138. See Sanchez, supra note 135, at A01.
139. See Act of Apr. 19, 2004, ch. 34, 2004 Cal. Stat. 94 (codified in scattered sections of
CAL. LAB. CODE).
140. See Garrett, Hybrid Democracy, supra note 2, at 1123.
141. See Robert Salladay & Dan Morain, Prop. 68 Backers Fold ‘Em, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 7,
2004, at B1; see also Cal. Sec’y of State, Cal-Access Campaign Finance: Yes on 68 Committee,
http://cal-access.ss.ca.gov/Campaign/Committees/Detail.aspx?id=1260733&session=2003
(showing a record of fundraising for the committee).
142. See GOVERNOR ARNOLD SCHWARZENEGGER’S BALLOT PROPOSITION VOTER GUIDE
(2004) (on file with author). In addition to the positions listed there, he also took positions on
Proposition 71, supporting a bond for stem cell research, and Proposition 62, supporting a
nonpartisan primary to replace the closed primaries.
143. See Garrett, Hybrid Democracy, supra note 2, at 1124.
144. Cal. Sec’y of State, California General Election: November 2, 2004, State Ballot
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which he had opposed on his slate mailer; this initiative funded mental health
services with the proceeds from a tax on millionaires.146 Schwarzenegger was
not very visible in the campaign opposing this initiative, perhaps sensing that
voters were likely to support both the program and the source of funding. His
opposition was mostly intended to signal to fiscal conservatives in his Party
that he would remain true to his “no taxes” pledge. He was less successful in
the state legislative races he chose to become involved in, a development that
led to his enthusiastic embrace of a nonpartisan redistricting commission a
few weeks later. His failure to translate his personal popularity into
influential endorsements of candidates was a chink in his armor, but he
seemed nearly invincible when he took an issue directly to the people.
Presumably, the results of the 2004 general election made his strategy of
governing through the threat of initiative more likely to change bargaining
dynamics in Sacramento.
After his victories in November, the Governor was emboldened to make
four specific threats in his State of the State Address in 2005. He demanded
that the legislature establish a nonpartisan redistricting commission of retired
judges; that it enact budget reform designed to reduce the amount of the
budget earmarked by initiatives, particularly Proposition 98, and to enforce a
hard cap on spending; that it change the public employees’ pension system
from a defined benefit to a defined contribution plan; and that it use a merit
pay system for public school teachers and change their tenure system so that
they could be more easily fired if their performance was unsatisfactory.147 His
campaign organization began raising record amounts of campaign funds and
circulating petitions to put the policies on the ballot in a special election in the
fall, but it was clear that he hoped to use the threats to force legislative action.
Although in some cases the reforms required constitutional change, and thus
a popular vote, victory would be more certain if the voters were asked by both
the Governor and the legislature to support any proposal. Schwarzenegger
preferred compromise, on terms acceptable to him, to continued interbranch
disagreement and a contested and lengthy initiative campaign. Even after he
called in June for a special election on his reform proposals, his staff
Measures, http://vote2004.ss.ca.gov/Returns/prop/00.htm (last visited May 31, 2006)
145. Id.
146. See Cal. Sec’y of State, Official Voter Information Guide, California General Election:
November 2004, Proposition 63, http://vote2004.ss.ca.gov/voterguide/propositions/prop63title.htm (last visited May 31, 2006).
147. Arnold Schwarzenegger, Governor of Cal., State of the State Address (Jan. 5, 2005),
available at http://www.governor.ca.gov/state/govsite/gov_homepage.jsp (follow “Speeches”
hyperlink; then follow “2005" hyperlink; then follow “Governor Schwarzenegger’s State of the
State Address 01/05/2005" hyperlink).
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continued to try to work out a deal with Democratic legislators so that they
could put consensus measures on the ballot.148
Schwarzenegger seemed surprised when the legislature called his bluff and
refused to negotiate seriously. Moreover, the Governor had to quickly back
down from one proposal that he touted in his State of the State; he took to the
people only three measures that were first mentioned in his address.149
Organized and effective opposition by teachers, nurses, and law enforcement
officers to the pension proposal resulted in the Governor’s decision not to put
this question on the ballot.150 Instead, he had to be content with a vague
promise — or mild threat — to pursue pension reform in the future. Moreover,
his sweeping public school reform was less ambitious when it was presented to
the people: the merit pay provisions were not part of the initiative.151
In the end, the Governor lost on all his initiatives — those that related to his
policy agenda described in his State of the State and those that he endorsed
during the campaign.152 After the voters’ resounding rejection of his proposals
in November 2005, the Governor no longer looked invincible at the polls, a
development which drew into question his continuing ability to use the threat
of the initiative to govern. The larger issue this story raises is whether
governing by threat of initiative is ever a sustainable strategy in the long run,
even for a politician who looks as strong as Schwarzenegger did following the
November 2004 victories.
B. Governance by Threat of Initiative Is Unsustainable
For more than a year, it appeared that Schwarzenegger would succeed in
creating an entirely new method of governing. He could threaten to take
policies to the people, negotiate a compromise with intimidated legislators,
148. See Gary Delsohn, Democrats, Governor’s Staff Say They’re Trying to Work Out
Compromises on Initiatives, SACRAMENTO BEE, June 17, 2005, at A1; Robert Salladay & Evan
Halper, As Popularity Ebbs, Governor Reaches Out, L.A. TIMES, June 22, 2005, at A1.
149. See Lynda Gledhill & John Wildermuth, Governor Defends About-Face, Foes Gleeful
That He Dropped Measure on Public Pensions, S.F. CHRON., Apr. 9, 2005, at B7 (describing
how Schwarzenegger had to abandon his pension proposal).
150. Jordan Rau, Governor Puts Agenda on the Ballot, L.A. TIMES, June 14, 2005, at A1;
Jill Stewart, Rise of the Political Machines, N.Y. TIMES, June 20, 2005, at A15 (“Night after
night the local news featured state workers clasping hands to chests in grief, claiming their
pensions were going to be privatized.”).
151. See Bill Ainsworth, Flaws Dooming Initiative Plans, Critics Contend, SAN DIEGO
UNION-TRIB., July 21, 2005, at A1.
152. See BRAD MCPHERSON, CAL. SEC’Y OF STATE, STATEMENT OF VOTE: SPECIAL
STATEWIDE ELECTION — NOVEMBER 8, 2005, at xiv (2005), available at http://ss.ca.gov/
elections/sov/2005_special/sov_entire.pdf (showing the defeat of the relevant propositions —
Proposition 74, Proposition 76, and Proposition 77).
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and then avoid actually going to the voters in many cases. At first, his threat
was credible and appeared to change bargaining dynamics sufficiently to
suggest that politics-as-usual in Sacramento would be disrupted. In 2005,
however, the limitations of governance that frequently uses hybrid democracy
have become apparent. Even a wealthy celebrity with access to unprecedented
amounts of campaign money like Arnold Schwarzenegger cannot effectively
govern entirely — or even largely — using this strategy. There are several
reasons why this is a perilous path.
First, initiatives necessary to govern, as opposed to those used purely for
political advantage, are very likely to be initiatives that are difficult to pass.
Unlike crypto-initiatives, ballot measures proposed as a way to implement real
change in policy and governance are quite likely to engender effective
opposition; after all, the reason the governor would resort to the threat was his
inability to pass his reforms through the legislature. To enact meaningful,
long-term budget reform, the Governor had to propose change that elicited
strong negative reaction from well-funded and organized interest groups.
Moreover, the Governor had to propose several relatively complicated
measures that expanded the number of opposing groups and diluted his focus.
For example, the effective opposition to his pension reform proposal not
only caused the governor to back away from this proposal, but it also hurt him
in all his other battles.153 In part because of his opponents’ attacks in rallies
and broadcast advertisements, the Governor’s popularity took a precipitous
drop in spring and summer of 2005, falling to under 40% in some polls.154 In
the first year of his term, his popularity was consistently in the 60% range, and
polls showed that he had support from Democrats and independents as well
as Republicans.155 Thus, the damage inflicted by the pension reform battle
was more serious than just losing on one item in his policy agenda; the
Governor went into the battle on his remaining policies in a weakened
position. Moreover, many of these same groups opposed his budget reform,
which included changing the preferential funding formula for education
mandated by Proposition 98, and his education reform, which involved

153. See David S. Broder, Has the Terminator Lost Touch?, WASH. POST, Oct. 2, 2005, at
B07 (noting that public service unions spent $25 million on ads attacking Schwarzenegger
before his committee broadcast its first advertisement in late September).
154. See Salladay & Halper, supra note 148, at A1.
155. See id. (approval rating dropped in six months from 60% to 40%); see also MARK
BALDASSARE, PPIC STATEWIDE SURVEY OCTOBER 2004: CALIFORNIANS AND THEIR
GOVERNMENT 13 (2004), available at http://www.ppic.org/content/pubs/S_1004MBS.pdf
(finding that Schwarzenegger had an approval rating around 60% among all adults for all of
2004, with 51% approval from Democrats and 62% approval from Independents in October).

https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol59/iss2/1

2006]

PROMISE & PERILS OF HYBRID DEMOCRACY

265

modifying tenure rules for public school teachers. They were energized
because of their victory on pension reform.
Second, threatening to use the initiative process exposes the politician to
attacks different from those emerging during the traditional legislative
interplay. For example, once a proposal has been submitted to the secretary
of state in order to get permission to circulate petitions, the text of the
proposed law or constitutional amendment cannot be changed.156 The
initiative process is thus much less flexible than policy making through the
legislature, where lawmakers can amend and modify text as drafters gather
more information and discover errors. Not only does the rigidity of the
process of legislating through direct democracy eliminate the possibility of
improving the proposal on the basis of new information and deliberation, but
it also opens the initiative to attack because of mistakes or sloppy drafting that
cannot be corrected. This weakness is exacerbated in California by the virtual
impossibility of modifying the initiative after it passes.
Schwarzenegger learned of this kind of peril several times during the course
of the 2005 election campaign. First, he had to withdraw his pension reform
initiative because the Attorney General interpreted his proposal not only as
changing the structure of state pensions but also as abolishing death benefits
for survivors of police officers and firefighters killed in the line of duty.157
Although the Governor contested this interpretation as one adopted by a
Democratic official seeking to undermine his agenda,158 the structure of direct
democracy denied him the easy response of just changing the language to
clarify that death benefits were protected. The airwaves soon were full of
testimonials of widows of police and firefighters that their families could not
have survived without the benefits, and this campaign forced the Governor to
postpone pension reform.159 The effort was not entirely in vain because of a
spillover effect: the Governor’s championing of pension reform has made it
salient and there are now several pension overhaul bills pending in the state
legislature.160

156. See Glen Staszewski, The Bait-and-Switch in Direct Democracy, 2006 WISC. L. REV.
17, 32-33.
157. See John Hill, Governor Retreats on Pensions: He Drops the Ballot Plan, a Key Part
of His Effort to Overhaul Government, SACRAMENTO BEE, Apr. 8, 2005, at A1. See generally
Proposed Initiative: California Public Employee Pension Reform Act, AG File No.
SA2005RF0070 (Feb. 10, 2005), available at http://ag.ca.gov/initiatives/pdf/SA2005RF0070.
pdf (giving the proposed provisions of the withdrawn initiative).
158. Lockyer has been criticized on this ground. See Salladay, supra note 33, at A1.
159. See Gledhill & Wildermuth, supra note 149, at B7.
160. See Mark Martin, Results Can Pale Next to Splashy Pledges, but Governor’s Bold
Pronouncements Have Had Influence, S.F. CHRON., June 27, 2005, at A1.
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A similar drafting error forced the Governor to back away from broad
educational reform that would have included a merit pay provision.
According to the Attorney General’s analysis of the initiative that
Schwarzenegger supported at the outset of the bargaining game, it would also
have repealed the portion of the education code that allows school districts to
fire teachers for alcoholism, immorality, or unprofessional conduct.161 The
measure on the ballot in November 2005 was a less ambitious reform aimed
only at teacher tenure rules.162
Perhaps the sloppiest error, however, occurred with respect to
Schwarzenegger’s redistricting proposal. California law requires that the
same version of an initiative that is submitted to the secretary of state be
circulated by signature gatherers.163 The group in charge of the petition
process — Peoples’ Advocate, led by a initiative-process veteran Ted
Costa — circulated a slightly different version from the one submitted to the
state.164 Although supporters argued that the differences were minor and
technical, Attorney General Lockyer went to court to remove the measure
from the special election ballot. He succeeded in the lower courts; the
superior court judge declined to determine whether the alternative versions
were close enough to accurately inform voters asked to sign the petition.165
Instead, she wrote, “[t]here is no good reason to put the courts in the position
of having to decide what is good enough for qualifying an initiative measure
for the ballot when actual compliance is easily attainable.”166 Ultimately, the
California Supreme Court allowed the initiative to remain on the ballot, ruling
tersely that there had been no showing that the people who signed the
initiative had been misled.167 In its final opinion on the issue, after the ballot
measure had been defeated, the Supreme Court held that the proposition was
161. See Ainsworth, supra note 151, at A1.
162. See John Marelius, No Offseason for Political Ads; Schwarzenegger’s Agenda,
National Issues Induce Onslaught, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIB., May 22, 2005, at A1; see also Put
the Kids First Act, Cal. Proposition 74 (2005), available at http://www.ss.ca.gov/elections/bp
_nov05/voter_info_pdf/entire74.pdf.
163. See CAL. CONST. art. II, § 10(d) (requiring a copy of the proposed initiative to be
submitted to the attorney general prior to circulation); CAL. ELEC. CODE § 9004 (West 2006)
(requiring the attorney general to prepare a title and summary of the proposed initiative based
upon a review of “the final version of a proposed initiative measure”).
164. See Lockyer v. McPherson, No. 05CS00998, 2005 WL 1719252, at *1, *1 (Cal. Super.
Ct. July 21, 2005), mandamus denied sub nom., Costa v. Superior Court, 32 Cal. Rptr. 3d 562
(Cal. Ct. App. 2005).
165. Id.
166. Id.
167. Costa v. Superior Court, 128 P.3d 149, 149 (Cal. 2005), granting review to 32 Cal.
Rptr. 3d 562.
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properly presented for a vote, notwithstanding the inadvertent and minor
discrepencies between the two versions, because the differences would not
have “affected the decision of any person to sign or not to sign the petition or
to take any other action related to the petition.”168 Even though the measure
remained on the ballot, the episode drew the competence of the Governor and
his initiative team into question.
Such sloppiness in drafting occurs in the legislative process, too, of course.
But if the errors are caught early in the process, they can be corrected and
clarified through amendment and redrafting. The initiative process lacks such
flexibility. Even in the case where initiative backers ultimately prevailed —
the redistricting initiative — the errors required judicial intervention for
resolution and caused substantial uncertainty during the campaign. The
traditional legislative process is considerably more flexible.
Third, the politician seeking to govern by initiative has only limited control
over the process once it is triggered. Of course, the legislative process is also
susceptible to unanticipated events, but the majority party has a great deal of
control over the legislative agenda, including the order in which topics will be
considered. In the initiative process, for example, other measures that qualify
for the ballot in an election being used by a governor to implement his agenda
can have spillover effects for his initiatives. Again, consider the 2005 special
election in California. A group apparently unrelated to the Governor or his
opponents qualified a constitutional initiative to require parental notification
before a minor can receive an abortion.169 The presence of this measure on the
ballot brought to the polls voters who might not have been interested enough
in the other initiatives to turn out. Because this was a special election, turnout
was particularly important. People do not have the lure of candidate elections
to get them to take the time to vote, so they have to feel strongly about one or
more of the ballot measures. An issue like abortion motivates an element of
the religious right, and it may energize voters on the left as well, particularly
in California. The initiative was a wild card in the election, complicating
strategies for the Governor and his opponents.
Other initiatives did not lead to the same type of uncertainty because they
were strategically placed on the ballot for the purpose of producing spillover
effects related to the Governor’s reform package. The so-called “paycheck
protection” measure in the November 2005 election, which would have
prohibited union dues from being used for political purposes without annual
written consent from union members,170 was supported by business interests.
168. Costa v. Superior Court, 128 P.3d 675, 699 (Cal. 2006), rev’g 32 Cal. Rptr. 3d 562.
169. Parent’s Right to Know and Child Protection Initiative, Cal. Proposition 73 (2005),
available at http://www.ss.ca.gov/election/bp_nov05/voter_info_pdf/text73.pdf.
170. See The Public Employees’ Right to Approve Use of Union Dues for Political
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In part, this measure was used to turn out anti-union groups and voters who
would also presumably support the Governor’s position on budget and
education reform. It was also a hot-button issue for unions, who spent more
than $56 million to kill the measure in the 2005 special election campaign.171
Fourth, governance by initiative, as it has been used by Schwarzenegger,
has resulted in a continuous campaign in California since the recall election
in fall 2003. The 2005 special election was merely the prelude to the 2006
gubernatorial election.172 A virtually perpetual campaign, with frequent
elections, is not a sign of a healthy democracy.173 It does not lead to a wellrun government; instead, it diverts the attention of elected officials from the
day-to-day operations of government to winning in a campaign.174
Furthermore, campaigns and elections are expensive. More than $662
million was raised to fund campaigns related to the initiatives on the 2005
special election ballot.175 The election itself cost around $50 million,176 and
it increased the financial pressures on local governments already strapped for
cash. The strategy of governing by threat of initiative, which means that the
state is in the midst of a perpetual campaign and voters are frequently asked
to cast ballots, may cause people to feel more alienated from government and
more frustrated with politicians. Frequency of elections may be one reason
for the relatively low turnout in the United States,177 so the special election
could negatively affect turnout in other elections. An occasional threat to go
around legislators to the people may inject a healthy dose of majoritarian
Campaign Purposes Act, Cal. Proposition 75 (2005), available at http://www.ss.ca.gov/
elections/bp_nov05/voter_info_pdf/text75.pdf.
171. California Secretary of State, Cal-Access, Campaign Finance: No on 75, http://
cal-access.ss.ca.gov/Campaign/Committees/Detail.aspx?id=1277769&session=2005&view=
general (last visited July 10, 2006).
172. See Robert Salladay, Initiative Drive Puts ’06 Governor’s Race in Gear, L.A. TIMES,
Sept. 22, 2005, at B1.
173. For a more optimistic view of governance by initiative, see John G. Matsusaka, A
Rolling Snowball of Direct Democracy, L.A. TIMES, June 15, 2005, at B13.
174. See Stewart, supra note 150, at A15 (arguing that Schwarzenegger “should be spending
his time fixing nuts-and-bolts problems, not gearing up a messy political campaign”).
175. Cal. Sec’y of State, Cal-Access Ballot Measure Summary Data Report for All
Propositions in the 2005 Special Election, http://dbsearch.ss.ca.gov/BallotSearch.aspx (Search
“Ballot Measure Summary Data Search” for “Special Election 08 November 2005") (last visited
July 10, 2006).
176. See Rau, supra note 150, at A1.
177. See, e.g., RUY A. TEIXEIRA, THE DISAPPEARING AMERICAN VOTER 54-57 (1992);
Richard W. Boyd, Decline of U.S. Voter Turnout: Structural Explanations, 9 AM. POL. Q. 133,
140-46 (1981). But see MARK N. FRANKLIN, VOTER TURNOUT AND THE DYNAMICS OF
ELECTORAL COMPETITION IN ESTABLISHED DEMOCRACIES SINCE 1945, at 98-99 (2004)
(disagreeing with the theory that frequency of elections causes low turnout).
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influence into policy making; constant threats which result in frequent votes
lead to a dismaying disarray in governance institutions.
This pessimistic portrayal of Schwarzenegger’s strategy should not be
understood as an argument to rule out any use of the initiative threat by
elected officials. The tactic injects into legislative bargaining a mechanism
that favors the preferences of the median voter and thus provides a
counterweight to powerful minorities with intense preferences. Used
sparingly, it changes policymaking in a normatively attractive way because it
is ultimately tied to the ability of the proposer — here the Governor — to
convince a majority of people to support him. The traditional legislative
process is disproportionately influenced by well-organized and well-funded
interests with intense preferences, with a majoritarian influence injected
through the electoral tie. Hybrid democracy adds more weapons to the arsenal
of those advocating reforms that resonate with the median voter. Moreover,
even though the legislature called Schwarzenegger’s bluff in 2005, his threats
still shaped the legislative agenda. For example, pension reform bills are
receiving more serious consideration in the legislature than they have before,
even though the Governor did not get that issue to the ballot.178 His budget
initiative was part of a larger national strategy by anti-tax groups and fiscal
conservatives to use the initiative process to impose hard spending caps on
state legislatures.179
Perhaps the concerns about initiative threats as a governance strategy are
not, in the long run, especially significant. Schwarzenegger has been a unique
politician, combining celebrity status, the ability to raise substantial money,
and, at least for a time, tremendous popularity. After the 2005 special election,
he found that his threat to resort to direct democracy was no longer credible,
and he faced the prospect of governing through traditional methods in an
environment of divided government. But now that he has made the possibility
of governance by initiative salient, we may see more elected officials resorting
to initiative to overcome legislative gridlock, a bargaining strategy available
only through hybrid democracy. Schwarzenegger’s experience may convince
politicians to use the threat carefully, although the story of hybrid democracy
and California’s governor is far from over. No reform of the initiative process
aimed at this peril is required; in the end, the political system will reach an
equilibrium as ordinary politicians and others occasionally threaten the
legislature with a ballot measure that is likely to resonate with voters, while
most bargaining still takes place within the traditional legislative arena.
178. See Martin, supra note 160, at A1.
179. See Evan Halper, Spending Cap Called Key to National Plan, L.A. TIMES, July 25,
2005, at A1; Daniel B. Wood, Cap State Spending: The Next New Wave?, CHRISTIAN SCI.
MONITOR, Aug. 2, 2005, at 1.
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IV. Conclusion
Reformers, politicians, and other political actors are increasingly
recognizing the opportunities provided by hybrid democracy. Like many other
aspects of our political system, the interactions between initiatives and
representative institutions have both positive and negative consequences. The
key is to harness the promise of hybrid democracy while minimizing its perils.
Both parts of a hybrid system can be shaped in different ways, and rules can
be changed over time to reflect experience. Because the players in the
political game adapt to new rules over time, scholars and others must work to
understand and describe new dynamics, and institutional reform must be
reconsidered to respond to these changes. In the end, the challenge — as well
as the ultimate strength — of democratic institutions is their flexibility and
endogeneity; the use of hybrid democracy is merely a variation on this larger
theme.
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